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Message-ID: <20211214202106.uazcwby3365x2ymw@black.fi.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 23:21:06 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com, david@...hat.com,
hpa@...or.com, jgross@...e.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
joro@...tes.org, jpoimboe@...hat.com, knsathya@...nel.org,
pbonzini@...hat.com, sdeep@...are.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/26] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early
boot
On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 07:18:14PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > In preparation of extending cc_platform_has() API to support TDX guest,
> > use CPUID instruction to detect for TDX guests support in the early
>
> " ... to detect support for TDX guests... "
Right, thanks.
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > index 793e9b42ace0..a61ac6f8821a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > @@ -872,6 +872,19 @@ config ACRN_GUEST
> > IOT with small footprint and real-time features. More details can be
> > found in https://projectacrn.org/.
> >
> > +# TDX guest uses X2APIC for interrupt management.
>
> For whom is that comment and who's going to see it? Is that comment
> supposed to explain the "depends on X86_X2APIC" below?
Yes.
But I think it should be pretty self-explanatory. I'll drop it.
> > +config INTEL_TDX_GUEST
> > + bool "Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) - Guest Support"
> > + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
> > + depends on X86_X2APIC
> > + help
> > + Support running as a guest under Intel TDX. Without this support,
> > + the guest kernel can not boot or run under TDX.
> > + TDX includes memory encryption and integrity capabilities
> > + which protect the confidentiality and integrity of guest
> > + memory contents and CPU state. TDX guests are protected from
> > + potential attacks from the VMM.
> > +
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
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