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Message-ID: <01d31dc7-c97f-ae76-9ba4-be6fcf03e605@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 13:33:45 +0200
From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>
To: linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Scull <ascull@...gle.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@...ux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@....com>,
Daniele Buono <dbuono@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing
secret area
Gentle ping for this series.
(also at https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ )
[+cc Gerd, Lenny]
Thanks,
-Dov
On 29/11/2021 13:42, Dov Murik wrote:
> Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs
> memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV,
> secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the
> guest starts running.
>
> OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its
> AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the
> Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were
> not available in the guest kernel.
>
> The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for
> injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs
> using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the
> EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.
>
> The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in
> the EFI configuration table. The second patch is a quirk fix for older
> firmwares didn't mark the secrets page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. The third
> patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of
> the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets
> with a file unlink interface. The fourth patch auto-loads the
> efi_secret module during startup if the injected secrets area is
> populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential
> computing secret injection.
>
> As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on
> encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret)
> using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the
> secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files
> into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.
>
> In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image
> because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because
> it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel).
> Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a
> confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
>
> This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side
> of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and
> therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any
> confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the
> standard EFI config table entry.
>
> To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the
> guest kernel.
>
> Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest
> to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:
>
> # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
>
> # xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
> 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka
> 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets......
> 00000020: 0607 ..
>
> # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
>
> # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 .
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
>
>
> [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
>
>
> ---
>
> v6 changes:
> - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated
> (thanks Greg KH).
> - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which
> is only defined for this arch.
> - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable.
> - Documentation fixes.
>
> v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v5 changes:
> - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware
> marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init()
> code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration
> table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP
> patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
> - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the
> confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add
> efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve
> this page.
> - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using
> ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches
> for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
> - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.
>
> v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v4 changes:
> - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef
> CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting
> CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
> - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86
> (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
>
> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
> v3 changes:
> - Rename the module to efi_secret
> - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range
> - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory
> - Document function wipe_memory
> - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect
> when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables
>
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
> v2 changes:
> - Export clean_cache_range()
> - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero
> - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
>
> RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
>
>
> Dov Murik (5):
> efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
> efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
> virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
> efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
> docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
>
> .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 51 +++
> Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 102 ++++++
> Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 +
> Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 +
> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +
> drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 +
> drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 58 +++
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 +
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 ++
> drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 +
> drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 14 +
> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 +
> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/efi.h | 10 +
> 16 files changed, 642 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret
> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst
> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst
> create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
> create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
> create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
>
>
> base-commit: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0
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