linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] kasan: fix quarantine conflicting with init_on

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Message-Id: <2805da5df4b57138fdacd671f5d227d58950ba54.1640037083.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 20 Dec 2021 22:55:59 +0100
From:   andrey.konovalov@...ux.dev
To:     Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] kasan: fix quarantine conflicting with init_on_free

From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>

KASAN's quarantine might save its metadata inside freed objects. As
this happens after the memory is zeroed by the slab allocator when
init_on_free is enabled, the memory coming out of quarantine is not
properly zeroed.

This causes lib/test_meminit.c tests to fail with Generic KASAN.

Zero the metadata when the object is removed from quarantine.

Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>

---

Changes v1->v2:
- Use memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
---
 mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
index 587da8995f2d..08291ed33e93 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
@@ -132,11 +132,22 @@ static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
 static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
 	void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
+	struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
 		local_irq_save(flags);
 
+	/*
+	 * If init_on_free is enabled and KASAN's free metadata is stored in
+	 * the object, zero the metadata. Otherwise, the object's memory will
+	 * not be properly zeroed, as KASAN saves the metadata after the slab
+	 * allocator zeroes the object.
+	 */
+	if (slab_want_init_on_free(cache) &&
+	    cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == 0)
+		memzero_explicit(meta, sizeof(*meta));
+
 	/*
 	 * As the object now gets freed from the quarantine, assume that its
 	 * free track is no longer valid.
-- 
2.25.1