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Date:   Tue, 28 Dec 2021 16:51:06 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To:     Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>
Cc:     dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de, bp@...en8.de,
        luto@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, seanjc@...gle.com, kai.huang@...el.com,
        cathy.zhang@...el.com, cedric.xing@...el.com,
        haitao.huang@...el.com, mark.shanahan@...el.com, hpa@...or.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/25] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs

On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 02:09:30PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Jarkko,
> 
> On 12/10/2021 11:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, 2021-12-06 at 13:18 -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> > > Hi Jarkko,
> > > 
> > > On 12/4/2021 2:43 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Dec 01, 2021 at 11:23:02AM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> > > > > By default a write page fault on a present PTE inherits the permissions
> > > > > of the VMA. Enclave page permissions maintained in the hardware's
> > > > > Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) may change after a VMA accessing the page
> > > > > is created. A VMA's permissions may thus exceed the enclave page
> > > > > permissions even though the VMA was originally created not to exceed
> > > > > the enclave page permissions. Following the default behavior during
> > > > > a page fault on a present PTE while the VMA permissions exceed the
> > > > > enclave page permissions would result in the PTE for an enclave page
> > > > > to be writable even though the page is not writable according to the
> > > > > enclave's permissions.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Consider the following scenario:
> > > > > * An enclave page exists with RW EPCM permissions.
> > > > > * A RW VMA maps the range spanning the enclave page.
> > > > > * The enclave page's EPCM permissions are changed to read-only.
> > > > 
> > > > How could this happen in the existing mainline code?
> > > 
> > > This is a preparatory patch for SGX2 support. Restricting the
> > > permissions of an enclave page would require OS support that is added in
> > > a later patch.
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > * There is no page table entry for the enclave page.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Q.
> > > > >    What will user space observe when an attempt is made to write to the
> > > > >    enclave page from within the enclave?
> > > > > 
> > > > > A.
> > > > >    Initially the page table entry is not present so the following is
> > > > >    observed:
> > > > >    1) Instruction writing to enclave page is run from within the enclave.
> > > > >    2) A page fault with second and third bits set (0x6) is encountered
> > > > >       and handled by the SGX handler sgx_vma_fault() that installs a
> > > > >       read-only page table entry following previous patch that installs
> > > > >       page table entry with permissions that VMA and enclave agree on
> > > > >       (read-only in this case).
> > > > >    3) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
> > > > >    4) A page fault with first three bits set (0x7) is encountered and
> > > > >       transparently (from SGX and user space perspective) handled by the
> > > > >       OS with the page table entry made writable because the VMA is
> > > > >       writable.
> > > > >    5) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
> > > > >    6) Since the EPCM permissions prevents writing to the page a new page
> > > > >       fault is encountered, this time with the SGX flag set in the error
> > > > >       code (0x8007). No action is taken by OS for this page fault and
> > > > >       execution returns to user space.
> > > > >    7) Typically such a fault will be passed on to an application with a
> > > > >       signal but if the enclave is entered with the vDSO function provided
> > > > >       by the kernel then user space does not receive a signal but instead
> > > > >       the vDSO function returns successfully with exception information
> > > > >       (vector=14, error code=0x8007, and address) within the exception
> > > > >       fields within the vDSO function's struct sgx_enclave_run.
> > > > > 
> > > > > As can be observed it is not possible for user space to write to an
> > > > > enclave page if that page's enclave page permissions do not allow so,
> > > > > no matter what the VMA or PTE allows.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Even so, the OS should not allow writing to a page if that page is not
> > > > > writable. Thus the page table entry should accurately reflect the
> > > > > enclave page permissions.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Do not blindly accept VMA permissions on a page fault due to a write
> > > > > attempt to a present PTE. Install a pfn_mkwrite() handler that ensures
> > > > > that the VMA permissions agree with the enclave permissions in this
> > > > > regard.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Considering the same scenario as above after this change results in
> > > > > the following behavior change:
> > > > > 
> > > > > Q.
> > > > >    What will user space observe when an attempt is made to write to the
> > > > >    enclave page from within the enclave?
> > > > > 
> > > > > A.
> > > > >    Initially the page table entry is not present so the following is
> > > > >    observed:
> > > > >    1) Instruction writing to enclave page is run from within the enclave.
> > > > >    2) A page fault with second and third bits set (0x6) is encountered
> > > > >       and handled by the SGX handler sgx_vma_fault() that installs a
> > > > >       read-only page table entry following previous patch that installs
> > > > >       page table entry with permissions that VMA and enclave agree on
> > > > >       (read-only in this case).
> > > > >    3) Instruction writing to enclave page is re-attempted.
> > > > >    4) A page fault with first three bits set (0x7) is encountered and
> > > > >       passed to the pfn_mkwrite() handler for consideration. The handler
> > > > >       determines that the page should not be writable and returns SIGBUS.
> > > > >    5) Typically such a fault will be passed on to an application with a
> > > > >       signal but if the enclave is entered with the vDSO function provided
> > > > >       by the kernel then user space does not receive a signal but instead
> > > > >       the vDSO function returns successfully with exception information
> > > > >       (vector=14, error code=0x7, and address) within the exception fields
> > > > >       within the vDSO function's struct sgx_enclave_run.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The accurate exception information supports the SGX runtime, which is
> > > > > virtually always implemented inside a shared library, by providing
> > > > > accurate information in support of its management of the SGX enclave.
> > > > 
> > > > This QA-format is not a great idea, as it kind of tells what are the legit
> > > > questions to ask.
> > > 
> > > I will remove the QA-format and just describe the two (before/after)
> > > scenarios.
> > > 
> > > > You should describe what the patch does and what are the
> > > > legit reasons for doing that. Unfortunately, in the current form it is very
> > > > hard to get grip of this patch.
> > > 
> > > That was the goal of the summary (the first paragraph) at the start of
> > > the changelog. Could you please elaborate how you would like me to
> > > improve it?
> > 
> > If I do a search "mktme" through the commit message, it gives
> > me zero results.
> 
> Could you please elaborate why you expect "mktme" to show up in the commit
> message?

I'm sorry, my mistake doubled: I ment to write mkwrite, and yes its use was well
described in the commit message.

/Jarkko

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