linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.10 42/48] binder: fix async_free

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Message-Id: <20220103142054.892318094@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  3 Jan 2022 15:24:19 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 42/48] binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels

From: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>

commit cfd0d84ba28c18b531648c9d4a35ecca89ad9901 upstream.

In 4.13, commit 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space")
fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch,
sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so
the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous
transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size.

Unfortunately, on the "free" side, the accounting of async_free_space
did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of
async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or
less.  These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue
has gone undetected for several years.

The fix is to use "buffer_size" (the allocated buffer size) instead of
"size" (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space
during the free operation. These are the same except for this
corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads < 8 bytes.

Fixes: 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 4.14+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220190150.2107077-1-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/android/binder_alloc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static void binder_free_buf_locked(struc
 	BUG_ON(buffer->user_data > alloc->buffer + alloc->buffer_size);

 	if (buffer->async_transaction) {
-		alloc->free_async_space += size + sizeof(struct binder_buffer);
+		alloc->free_async_space += buffer_size + sizeof(struct binder_buffer);

 		binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_BUFFER_ALLOC_ASYNC,
 			     "%d: binder_free_buf size %zd async free %zd\n",