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Message-ID: <YdYXEBhc7vuY+GQW@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jan 2022 14:09:20 -0800
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7] lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in
On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 11:01:04PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Wed, 5 Jan 2022 at 22:53, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 06:02:52PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > The only downside here is that the ARM/x86 accelerated shashes and the
> > > generic shash now use the same core transform, right?
> >
> > I don't see how this is the case, given that crypto/blake2s_generic.c still uses
> > blake2s_compress_generic(), not blake2s_compress().
> >
>
> Ah ok, I stand corrected then.
>
> So what are your thoughts on this? Should we keep the shashes while
> they have no users?
I don't know. Removing unused stuff is good per se, but I wouldn't have
expected this to be something that is being considered here. It's not like this
is a "controversial" algorithm, blake2b is already supported, and there could be
users of it already (dm-integrity, dm-verity, AF_ALG, etc.). If this is going
to happen, then the acceptance criteria for new algorithms need to get *much*
stricter, so that algorithms aren't constantly being added and removed.
- Eric
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