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Message-ID: <CAHmME9rmWBA02SyeFiiGZ8=kydYJSJwcYPscBrTBzoXMEPH9sQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 23:19:56 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>,
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Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v43 01/15] Linux Random Number Generator
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 9:18 PM Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
> In general, you need FIPS
> certification for some specific use cases / application. For example,
> if you're going for PCI compliance, then you might only need FIPS
> compliance for your OpenSSL library. What the FIPS certification lab
> might consider acceptable for its entropy for its DRBG is an
> interesting question. For some, simply having the OpenSSL library use
> RDSEED or RDRAND might be sufficient. Or it could talk to an actual
> physical RNG device.
>
> So disabling getrandom() is probably not necessary, just so long as
> you can demonstrate that the FIPS cryptographic module --- i.e., the
> OpenSSL library --- is getting its entropy from an acceptable source.
I don't know exactly what these people think they want, but what you
say seems probably correct.
> I suspect what's actually going on is that some enterprise customers
> have FIPS complaince on a check-off list, and they aren't actually
> getting a formal FIPS certification. Or they only need something to
> wave under the noses of their PCI certification company, and so the
> question is what makes them happy.
Right.
> And this is why some FIPS certification have gotten by just *fine*
> with a pure userspace OpenSSL library as their FIPS cryptographic
> module. Where you draw the line between a "blessed" entropy source
> and one that's just hand-waving is really at the discretion of the
> certification lab.
Hah, probably correct.
So, seen this way, and combined with the solution provided at [1] (or
similar) for people who think they need something there, it seems like
the FIPS people can likely get what they need without really needing
to involve the kernel anyway.
Jason
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YdynXjhhuQfbYuSb@zx2c4.com/
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