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Date:   Mon, 10 Jan 2022 14:49:57 +0100
From:   Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>
To:     keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
        Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Nayna <nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Hari Bathini <hbathini@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        Frank van der Linden <fllinden@...zon.com>,
        Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>, buendgen@...ibm.com,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
messages about the signature.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/verification.h             |  4 +++-
 kernel/module.c                          |  3 ++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 11 ++++++-----
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					 "kexec_file");
+					 VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return 0;
 
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					"kexec_file");
+					VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
 	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE]		= "kexec PE sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE]		= "key sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE]		= "key self sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE]	= "kexec appended sig",
 	[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE]	= "unspec sig",
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
 	VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+	VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
 	NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
 };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 #endif
 
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 */
 	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
-						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+						VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
  */
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
 
 	if (markerlen > modlen)
 		return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

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