linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86/svm: Add module param to control PMU virtualization

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Message-ID: <1f293656-49f5-ce02-1c59-a0f215306033@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 11 Jan 2022 10:11:21 +0800
From:   Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com>
To:     Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, David Dunn <daviddunn@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86/svm: Add module param to control PMU
 virtualization

On 11/1/2022 2:13 am, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 9, 2022 at 10:23 PM Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 9/1/2022 9:23 am, Jim Mattson wrote:
>>> On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 7:48 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 6:15 PM Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/10/21 20:25, Jim Mattson wrote:
>>>>>> In the long run, I'd like to be able to override this system-wide
>>>>>> setting on a per-VM basis, for VMs that I trust. (Of course, this
>>>>>> implies that I trust the userspace process as well.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How would you feel if we were to add a kvm ioctl to override this
>>>>>> setting, for a particular VM, guarded by an appropriate permissions
>>>>>> check, like capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) or capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)?
>>>>>
>>>>> What's the rationale for guarding this with a capability check?  IIRC
>>>>> you don't have such checks for perf_event_open (apart for getting kernel
>>>>> addresses, which is not a problem for virtualization).
>>>>
>>>> My reasoning was simply that for userspace to override a mode 0444
>>>> kernel module parameter, it should have the rights to reload the
>>>> module with the parameter override. I wasn't thinking specifically
>>>> about PMU capabilities.
>>
>> Do we have a precedent on any module parameter rewriting for privileger ?
>>
>> A further requirement is whether we can dynamically change this part of
>> the behaviour when the guest is already booted up.
>>
>>>
>>> Assuming that we trust userspace to decide whether or not to expose a
>>> virtual PMU to a guest (as we do on the Intel side), perhaps we could
>>> make use of the existing PMU_EVENT_FILTER to give us per-VM control,
>>> rather than adding a new module parameter for per-host control. If
>>
>> Various granularities of control are required to support vPMU production
>> scenarios, including per-host, per-VM, and dynamic-guest-alive control.
>>
>>> userspace calls KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER with an action of
>>> KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW and an empty list of allowed events, KVM could
>>> just disable the virtual PMU for that VM.
>>
>> AMD will also have "CPUID Fn8000_0022_EBX[NumCorePmc, 3:0]".
> 
> Where do you see this? Revision 3.33 (November 2021) of the AMD APM,
> volume 3, only goes as high as CPUID Fn8000_0021.

Try APM Revision: 4.04 (November 2021),  page 1849/3273,
"CPUID Fn8000_0022_EBX Extended Performance Monitoring and Debug".

Given the current ambiguity in this revision, the AMD folks will reveal more
details bout this field in the next revision.

> 
>>>
>>> Today, the semantics of an empty allow list are quite different from
>>> the proposed pmuv module parameter being false. However, it should be
>>> an easy conversion. Would anyone be concerned about changing the
>>> current semantics of an empty allow list? Is there a need for
>>> disabling PMU virtualization for legacy userspace implementations that
>>> can't be modified to ask for an empty allow list?
>>>
>>
>> AFAI, at least one user-space agent has integrated with it plus additional
>> "action"s.
>>
>> Once the API that the kernel presents to user space has been defined,
>> it's best not to change it and instead fall into remorse.
> 
> Okay.
> 
> I propose the following:
> 1) The new module parameter should apply to Intel as well as AMD, for
> situations where userspace is not trusted.
> 2) If the module parameter allows PMU virtualization, there should be
> a new KVM_CAP whereby userspace can enable/disable PMU virtualization.
> (Since you require a dynamic toggle, and there is a move afoot to
> refuse guest CPUID changes once a guest is running, this new KVM_CAP
> is needed on Intel as well as AMD).

Both hands in favour. Do you need me as a labourer, or you have a ready-made one ?

> 3) If the module parameter does not allow PMU virtualization, there
> should be no userspace override, since we have no precedent for
> authorizing that kind of override.

Uh, I thought you (Google) had a lot of these (interesting) use cases internally.

> 
>> "But I am not a decision maker. " :D
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Like Xu
>>