[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <6cefad75-9e7e-1cf8-22ad-bbee8a105933@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 16:35:08 +0800
From: "libaokun (A)" <libaokun1@...wei.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
<mszeredi@...hat.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"zhangyi (F)" <yi.zhang@...wei.com>,
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@...wei.com>,
Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: Questions about the patch 054aa8d439b9 ("fget: check that the fd
still exists after getting a ref to it")
在 2022/1/10 17:09, Jann Horn 写道:
> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 11:32 AM libaokun (A) <libaokun1@...wei.com> wrote:
>>> From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>>> Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 10:06:14 -0800
>>> Subject: fget: check that the fd still exists after getting a ref to it
>>>
>>> Jann Horn points out that there is another possible race wrt Unix domain
>>> socket garbage collection, somewhat reminiscent of the one fixed in
>>> commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
>>>
>>> See the extended comment about the garbage collection requirements added
>>> to unix_peek_fds() by that commit for details.
>>>
>>> The race comes from how we can locklessly look up a file descriptor just
>>> as it is in the process of being closed, and with the right artificial
>>> timing (Jann added a few strategic 'mdelay(500)' calls to do that), the
>>> Unix domain socket garbage collector could see the reference count
>>> decrement of the close() happen before fget() took its reference to the
>>> file and the file was attached onto a new file descriptor.
>> I analyzed this CVE and tried to reproduce it.
>>
>> I guess he triggered it like the stack below.
>>
>>
>> close_fd |
>> pick_file |
>> | __fget_files
>> file = files_lookup_fd_rcu(files, fd); |
>> |
>> rcu_assign_pointer(fdt->fd[fd], NULL);
>> filp_close |
>> fput |
>> | get_file_rcu_many // ned ref>=1
>> fput_many(file, 1); |
>> file_free(file); |
>> | return file
>> | // read-after-free
> The race is more complicated than that; you also need to add unix_gc()
> to the race. And if you want to get to memory corruption, you need one
> or two more races involving unix_stream_read_generic() on top of that.
>
>> If you want to successfully execute the get_file_rcu_many function,
>>
>> the reference counting of the file is greater than or equal to 1 and
>>
>> is greater than or equal to 2 after the execution.
>>
>> However, close releases only one reference count and does not release
>> the file,
>>
>> so read-after-free does not occur. So how is the race triggered here?
> This bug does not lead to a UAF of the file, it leads to a locking
> inconsistency between the unix stream read path and the GC.
>
>> The question has been pondered for a long time without any results.
>>
>> Could I get more details (e.g. reproduction methods or stacks) from you ?
> See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2247 for
> the original bug report. I'm also working on a more detailed blog
> post, but that isn't finished yet.
> .
Thank you very much for your reply!
With your help, I have understood the problem and successfully
reproduced it.
Thanks a million!
--
With Best Regards,
Baokun Li
Powered by blists - more mailing lists