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Message-Id: <65d9913441b16e27b672cfabbab24fa5c12bee14.1641900831.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 12:37:47 +0100
From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>
To: keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Nayna <nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Hari Bathini <hbathini@...ux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
Frank van der Linden <fllinden@...zon.com>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>, buendgen@...ibm.com,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature
Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
messages about the signature.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>
---
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
include/linux/verification.h | 4 +++-
kernel/module.c | 3 ++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 11 ++++++-----
6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
{
return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- "kexec_file");
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
return 0;
return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- "kexec_file");
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE] = "kexec appended sig",
[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
};
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
#endif
int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
- struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for purpose);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
*/
if (flags == 0) {
err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
- VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
if (!err) {
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
* @data: The data to be verified
* @len: Size of @data.
* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
*/
int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
- struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for purpose)
{
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
struct module_signature *ms;
unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
int ret;
- pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+ pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
if (markerlen > modlen)
return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
- ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
+ ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
trusted_keys,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ purpose,
NULL, NULL);
}
--
2.31.1
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