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Message-ID: <1765621.jvH33SIsIh@tauon.chronox.de>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 13:35:12 +0100
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, Torsten Duwe <duwe@...e.de>,
Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@...wei.com>,
Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@...el.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
qat-linux@...el.com, keyrings@...r.kernel.org, simo@...hat.com,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Petr Vorel <pvorel@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Am Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
> > On an unrelated note, this will break trusted_key_tpm_ops->init() in
> > FIPS mode, because trusted_shash_alloc() would fail to get a hold of
> > sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make the init_trusted() module_init
> > to fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko imports key_type_trusted, prevent the
> > loading of that one as well. Not sure that's desired...
>
> Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should
SHA-1 is approved in all use cases except signatures.
Ciao
Stephan
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