Message-ID: <YeMdIrMXbSq7BgzY@iki.fi>
Date:   Sat, 15 Jan 2022 21:14:42 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "dwmw2@...radead.org" <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "ardb@...nel.org" <ardb@...nel.org>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "nayna@...ux.ibm.com" <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "torvalds@...ux-foundation.org" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "weiyongjun1@...wei.com" <weiyongjun1@...wei.com>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com" 
        <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        "pjones@...hat.com" <pjones@...hat.com>,
        Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called
 machine

On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 07:12:35PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Jan 15, 2022, at 10:11 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On Wed, Jan 12, 2022 at 02:41:47PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 20:14 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >>> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 21:26 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >>>> 
> >>>>> On Jan 11, 2022, at 11:16 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> On Mon, 2022-01-10 at 23:25 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >>>>>>> Jarkko, my concern is that once this version of the patch set is
> >>>>>>> upstreamed, would limiting which keys may be loaded onto the .machine
> >>>>>>> keyring be considered a regression?
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Currently certificates built into the kernel do not have a CA restriction on them.  
> >>>>>> IMA will trust anything in this keyring even if the CA bit is not set.  While it would 
> >>>>>> be advisable for a kernel to be built with a CA, nothing currently enforces it. 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> My thinking for the dropped CA restriction patches was to introduce a new Kconfig.  
> >>>>>> This Kconfig would do the CA enforcement on the machine keyring.  However if the 
> >>>>>> Kconfig option was not set for enforcement, it would work as it does in this series, 
> >>>>>> plus it would allow IMA to work with non-CA keys.  This would be done by removing 
> >>>>>> the restriction placed in this patch. Let me know your thoughts on whether this would 
> >>>>>> be an appropriate solution.  I believe this would get around what you are identifying as 
> >>>>>> a possible regression.
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> True the problem currently exists with the builtin keys, but there's a
> >>>>> major difference between trusting the builtin keys and those being
> >>>>> loading via MOK.  This is an integrity gap that needs to be closed and
> >>>>> shouldn't be expanded to keys on the .machine keyring.
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> "plus it would allow IMA to work with non-CA keys" is unacceptable.
> >>>> 
> >>>> Ok, I’ll leave that part out.  Could you clarify the wording I should include in the future 
> >>>> cover letter, which adds IMA support, on why it is unacceptable for the end-user to
> >>>> make this decision?
> >>> 
> >>> The Kconfig IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
> >>> "help" is very clear:
> >> 
> >> [Reposting the text due to email formatting issues.]
> >> 
> >> help
> >>  Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
> >>  key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or
> >>  secondary trusted keyrings.
> >> 
> >>  Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the 
> >>  IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,
> >>  provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the
> >>  built-in or secondary trusted keyrings.
> >> 
> >> 
> >> The first paragraph requires "validly signed by a CA cert in the system
> >> built-in or secondary trusted keyrings" for keys to be loaded onto the
> >> IMA keyring.  This Kconfig is limited to just the builtin and secondary
> >> keyrings.  Changing this silently to include the ".machine" keyring
> >> introduces integrity risks that previously did not exist.  A new IMA
> >> Kconfig needs to be defined to allow all three keyrings - builtin,
> >> machine, and secondary.
> >> 
> >> The second paragraph implies that only CA and intermediate CA keys are
> >> on secondary keyring, or as in our case the ".machine" keyring linked
> >> to the secondary keyring.
> >> 
> >> Mimi
> >> 
> > I have also now test environment for this patch set but if there are
> > any possible changes, I'm waiting for a new version, as it is anyway
> > for 5.18 cycle earliest.
> 
> Other than the two sentence changes, I have not seen anything identified 
> code wise requiring a change.  If you’d like me to respin a v10 with the sentence 
> changes let me know.  Or if you want to remove the ima reference, that works 
> too.  Just let me know how you want to handle this.  Thanks.

I'm basically waiting also Mimi to test this as I do not have IMA test
environment.

>From my side:

Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>

/Jarkko

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