Message-ID: <12f34bb9-e725-b852-7c26-256e0c6ad7da@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Sun, 16 Jan 2022 00:24:03 -0500
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Vitaly Chikunov <vt@...linux.org>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 4/5] ima: support fs-verity file digest based
 signatures


On 1/15/22 22:31, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 1/15/22 01:21, Eric Biggers wrote:
>> On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 08:31:01AM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
>>> Eric,
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jan 09, 2022 at 01:07:18PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
>>>> On Sun, Jan 09, 2022 at 11:45:37PM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 03:37:39PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 31, 2021 at 10:35:00AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>>> On Thu, 2021-12-02 at 14:07 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 02, 2021 at 04:55:06PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>>>>>       case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
>>>>>>>>> -        fallthrough;
>>>>>>>>> +        set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>> +        /*
>>>>>>>>> +         * The IMA signature is based on a hash of 
>>>>>>>>> IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG
>>>>>>>>> +         * and the fs-verity file digest, not directly on the
>>>>>>>>> +         * fs-verity file digest.  Both digests should 
>>>>>>>>> probably be
>>>>>>>>> +         * included in the IMA measurement list, but for now 
>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>> +         * digest is only used for verifying the IMA signature.
>>>>>>>>> +         */
>>>>>>>>> +        verity_digest[0] = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG;
>>>>>>>>> +        memcpy(verity_digest + 1, iint->ima_hash->digest,
>>>>>>>>> +               iint->ima_hash->length);
>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>> +        hash.hdr.algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
>>>>>>>>> +        hash.hdr.length = iint->ima_hash->length;
>>>>>>>> This is still wrong because the bytes being signed don't 
>>>>>>>> include the hash
>>>>>>>> algorithm.  Unless you mean for it to be implicitly always 
>>>>>>>> SHA-256?  fs-verity
>>>>>>>> supports SHA-512 too, and it may support other hash algorithms 
>>>>>>>> in the future.
>>>>>>> IMA assumes that the file hash algorithm and the signature 
>>>>>>> algorithm
>>>>>>> are the same.   If they're not the same, for whatever reason, the
>>>>>>> signature verification would simply fail.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Based on the v2 signature header 'type' field, IMA can 
>>>>>>> differentiate
>>>>>>> between regular IMA file hash based signatures and fs-verity file
>>>>>>> digest based signatures.  The digest field (d-ng) in the IMA
>>>>>>> meausrement list prefixes the digest with the hash algorithm. I'm
>>>>>>> missing the reason for needing to hash fs-verity's file digest with
>>>>>>> other metadata, and sign that hash rather than fs-verity's file 
>>>>>>> digest
>>>>>>> directly.
>>>>>> Because if someone signs a raw hash, then they also implicitly 
>>>>>> sign the same
>>>>>> hash value for all supported hash algorithms that produce the 
>>>>>> same length hash.
>>>>> Unless there is broken hash algorithm allowing for preimage 
>>>>> attacks this
>>>>> is irrelevant. If there is two broken algorithms allowing for 
>>>>> collisions,
>>>>> colliding hashes could be prepared even if algo id is hashed too.
>>>>>
>>>> Only one algorithm needs to be broken.  For example, SM3 has the 
>>>> same hash
>>>> length as SHA-256.  If SM3 support were to be added to fs-verity, 
>>>> and if someone
>>>> were to find a way to find an input that has a specific SM3 digest, 
>>>> then they
>>>> could also make it match a specific SHA-256 digest.  Someone might 
>>>> intend to
>>>> sign a SHA-256 digest, but if they are only signing the raw 32 
>>>> bytes of the
>>>> digest, then they would also be signing the corresponding SM3 
>>>> digest.  That's
>>>> why the digest that is signed *must* also include the algorithm 
>>>> used in the
>>>> digest (not the algorithm(s) used in the signature, which is 
>>>> different).
>>> I think it will be beneficial if we pass hash algo id to the
>>> akcipher_alg::verify. In fact, ecrdsa should only be used with 
>>> streebog.
>>> And perhaps, sm2 with sm3, pkcs1 with md/sha/sm3, and ecdsa with sha 
>>> family
>>> hashes.
>>>
>> I was going to reply to this thread again, but I got a bit distracted by
>> everything else being broken.  Yes, the kernel needs to be 
>> restricting which
>> hash algorithms can be used with each public key algorithm, along the 
>> lines of
>> what you said.  I asked the BoringSSL maintainers for advice, and 
>> they confirmed
>> that ECDSA just signs/verifies a raw hash, and in fact it *must* be a 
>> raw hash
>> for it to be secure.  This is a design flaw in ECDSA, which was fixed 
>> in newer
>> algorithms such as EdDSA and SM2 as those have a hash built-in to the 
>> signature
>> scheme.  To mitigate it, the allowed hash algorithms must be 
>> restricted; in the
>> case of ECDSA, that means to the SHA family (preferably excluding 
>> SHA-1).
>>
>> akcipher_alg::verify doesn't actually know which hash algorithm is 
>> used, except
>> in the case of rsa-pkcs1pad where it is built into the name of the 
>> algorithm.
>> So it can't check the hash algorithm.  I believe it needs to happen in
>> public_key_verify_signature() (and I'm working on a patch for that).
>>
>> Now, SM2 is different from ECDSA and ECRDSA in that it uses the 
>> modern design
>> that includes the hash into the signature algorithm.  This means that 
>> it must be
>> used to sign/verify *data*, not a hash.  (Well, you can sign/verify a 
>> hash, but
>> SM2 will hash it again internally.)  Currently, 
>> public_key_verify_signature()
>> allows SM2 to be used to sign/verify a hash, skipping the SM2 
>> internal hash, and
>> IMA uses this.  This is broken and must be removed, since it isn't 
>> actually the
>> SM2 algorithm as specified anymore, but rather some homebrew thing 
>> with unknown
>> security properties. (Well, I'm not confident about SM2, but homebrew 
>> is worse.)
>>
>> Adding fs-verity support to IMA also complicates things, as doing it 
>> naively
>> would introduce an ambiguity about what is signed.  Naively, the 
>> *data* that is
>> signed (considering the hash as part of the signature algorithm) 
>> would be either
>> the whole file, in the case of traditional IMA, or the 
>> fsverity_descriptor
>> struct, in the case of IMA with fs-verity.  However, a file could 
>> have contents
>> which match an fsverity_descriptor struct; that would create an 
>> ambiguity.
>>
>> Assuming that it needs to be allowed that the same key can sign files 
>> for both
>> traditional and fs-verity hashing, solving this problem will require 
>> a second
>> hash.  The easiest way to do this would be sign/verify the following 
>> struct:
>>
>>     struct ima_file_id {
>>         u8 is_fsverity;
>>         u8 hash_algorithm;
>>         u8 hash[];
>>     };
>
>
> To calrify, I suppose that for ECDSA NIST P256 you would allow pairing 
> with any of the SHA family hashes (also as defined by the existing 
> OIDs) and as the standard allows today? And the same then applies for 
> NIST p384 etc.?
>
> Further, I suppose similar restriction would apply for ECRDSA to pair 
> it with Streebog only, as Vitaly said.
>
>
> What's happening now is that to verify a signature, IMA/integrity 
> subsystem fills out the following structure:
>
> struct public_key_signature pks;
>
> pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo];  // name of hash algo 
> will go into this here, e.g., 'sha256'
> pks.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo; // this is either 'rsa', 'ecdsa-', 
> 'ecrdsa-' or 'sm2' string
>
> It then calls:
>
>     ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
>
> IMO, in the call path down this function the pairing of public key and 
> hash algo would have to be enforced in order to enforce the standards. 
> Would this not be sufficient to be able to stay with the standards ?
>
> File hashes: IMA calculates the hash over a file itself by calling 
> crypto functions, so at least the digest's bytes are trusted input in 
> that respect and using the sha family type of hashes directly with 
> ECDSA should work. Which algorithm IMA is supposed to use for the 
> hashing is given in the xattr bytestream header. IMA could then take 
> that type of hash, lookup the hash function, perform the hashing on 
> the data, and let verify_signature enforce the pairing, rejecting file 
> signatures with wrong pairing. This way the only thing that is needed 
> is 'enforcement of pairing'.
>
> Fsverity: How much control does a user have over the hash family 
> fsverity is using? Can IMA ECDSA/RSA users tell it to use a sha family 
> hash and ECRDSA users make it use a Streebog hash so that also the 
> pairing of hash and key type can work 'naturally' and we don't need 
> the level of indirection via your structure above?
>
>     Stefan
>
>

I would propos probably 3 patches that combined result in the following 
for enforcement of pairing. I think RSA isn't necessary to enforce since 
the OID in the signature contains the hash that was used. For SM2 I am 
not so sure about.

 From 800f11c32f6e64d328404c9fdd7abb6057dbebb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2022 00:07:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] keys: asymmetric: Enforce key type and hash algo 
pairing for
  signatures

Enforce the pairing of ECRDSA with Streebog hash type, SM2 with SM3 hash,
and ECDSA with the SHA family of hashes for the low level
verify_signature() API.

Note: X509 certificates already have enforcement through the availability
of OIDs.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
---
  crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c 
b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 4fefb219bfdc..760b541d2803 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
  #include <crypto/akcipher.h>
  #include <crypto/sm2.h>
  #include <crypto/sm3_base.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>

  MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
  MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
@@ -305,6 +306,60 @@ static inline int cert_sig_digest_update(
  }
  #endif /* ! IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) */

+/* ECDSA allowed hashes */
+static const enum hash_algo ecdsa_hashes[] = {
+       HASH_ALGO_SHA1,
+       HASH_ALGO_SHA224,
+       HASH_ALGO_SHA256,
+       HASH_ALGO_SHA384,
+       HASH_ALGO_SHA512,
+};
+
+/* SM2 allowed hashes */
+static const enum hash_algo sm2_hashes[] = {
+       HASH_ALGO_SM3_256,
+};
+
+/* ECRDSA allowed hashes */
+static const enum hash_algo ecrdsa_hashes[] = {
+       HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_256,
+       HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_512,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check the pairing for key algorithm and hash for ECDSA
+ * and ECRDSA.
+ */
+static int check_pkey_hash_algo_pairing(const struct 
public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+       const enum hash_algo *array = NULL;
+       size_t array_size;
+       size_t i;
+
+       if (!strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa")) {
+               array = ecrdsa_hashes;
+               array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(ecrdsa_hashes);
+       } else if (!strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2")) {
+               array = sm2_hashes;
+               array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(sm2_hashes);
+       } else if (!strncmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6)) {
+               /* ecdsa-nist-p192 etc. */
+               array = ecdsa_hashes;
+               array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(ecdsa_hashes);
+       }
+
+       if (array) {
+               for (i = 0; i < array_size; i++) {
+                       if (!strcmp(sig->hash_algo,
+                                   hash_algo_name[array[i]]))
+                               return 0;
+               }
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
  /*
   * Verify a signature using a public key.
   */
@@ -325,6 +380,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct 
public_key *pkey,
         BUG_ON(!sig);
         BUG_ON(!sig->s);

+       ret = check_pkey_hash_algo_pairing(sig);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
         ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding,
                                               sig->hash_algo,
                                               pkey, alg_name);
--
2.31.1

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