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Message-ID: <20220117215449.2qboqd3nmsky2g3w@nitro.local>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 16:54:49 -0500
From: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@...uxfoundation.org>
To: "Maciej S. Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, dhowells@...hat.com,
dwmw2@...radead.org, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
davem@...emloft.net, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...nel.org,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
On Mon, Jan 17, 2022 at 09:59:22PM +0100, Maciej S. Szmigiero wrote:
> > I am concerned that ed25519 private key management is very rudimentary -- more
> > often than not it is just kept somewhere on disk, often without any passphrase
> > encryption.
> >
> > With all its legacy warts, GnuPG at least has decent support for hardware
> > off-load via OpenPGP smartcards or TPM integration in GnuPG 2.3, but the best
> > we have with ed25519 is passhprase protection as implemented in minisign (and
>
> I am not sure that I understood your point here correctly, but GnuPG
> already supports ed25519 keys, including stored on a smartcard - for
> example, on a YubiKey [1].
Yes, I know, but you cannot use ed25519-capable OpenPGP smartcards to create
non-PGP signatures. The discussion was about using ed25519 signatures
directly (e.g. like signify/minisign do). Jason pointed out to me on IRC that
it's possible to do it with YubiHSM, but it's an expensive device ($650 USD
from Yubico).
> While the current software support for ed25519 might be limited, there
> is certainly progress being made, RFC 8410 allowed these algos for X.509
> certificates.
> Support for such certificates is already implemented in OpenSSL [2].
>
> ECDSA, on the other hand, is very fragile with respect to random number
> generation at signing time.
> We know that people got burned here in the past.
I think this is taking us far away from the main topic (which
signing/verification standards to use in-kernel).
-K
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