linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] vfs: check dentry is still valid in get

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Message-ID: <YeYYp89adipRN64k@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk>
Date:   Tue, 18 Jan 2022 01:32:23 +0000
From:   Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To:     Brian Foster <bfoster@...hat.com>
Cc:     Ian Kent <raven@...maw.net>, "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@...nel.org>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        xfs <linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfs: check dentry is still valid in get_link()

On Mon, Jan 17, 2022 at 07:48:49PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> > But that critically depends upon the contents not getting mangled.  If it
> > *can* be screwed by such unlink, we risk successful lookup leading to the
> > wrong place, with nothing to tell us that it's happening.  We could handle
> > that by adding a check to fs/namei.c:put_link(), and propagating the error
> > to callers.  It's not impossible, but it won't be pretty.
> > 
> > And that assumes we avoid oopsen on string changing under us in the first
> > place.  Which might or might not be true - I hadn't finished the audit yet.
> > Note that it's *NOT* just fs/namei.c + fs/dcache.c + some fs methods -
> > we need to make sure that e.g. everything called by ->d_hash() instances
> > is OK with strings changing right under them.  Including utf8_to_utf32(),
> > crc32_le(), utf8_casefold_hash(), etc.
> 
> And AFAICS, ext4, xfs and possibly ubifs (I'm unfamiliar with that one and
> the call chains there are deep enough for me to miss something) have the
> "bugger the contents of string returned by RCU ->get_link() if unlink()
> happens" problem.
> 
> I would very much prefer to have them deal with that crap, especially
> since I don't see why does ext4_evict_inode() need to do that memset() -
> can't we simply check ->i_op in ext4_can_truncate() and be done with
> that?

This reuse-without-delay has another fun side, AFAICS.  Suppose the new use
for inode comes with the same ->i_op (i.e. it's a symlink again) and it
happens right after ->get_link() has returned the pointer to body.

We are already past whatever checks we might add in pick_link().  And the
pointer is still valid.  So we end up quietly traversing the body of
completely unrelated symlink that never had been anywhere near any directory
we might be looking at.  With no indication of anything going wrong - just
a successful resolution with bogus result.

Could XFS folks explain what exactly goes wrong if we make actual marking
inode as ready for reuse RCU-delayed, by shifting just that into
->free_inode()?  Why would we need any extra synchronize_rcu() anywhere?