[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <cd79f893-c711-1a60-47d6-7c392e02fc6a@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 13:53:35 +0100
From: Thomas Huth <thuth@...hat.com>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@...ux.ibm.com>,
Janosch Frank <frankja@...ux.ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: s390: Add vm IOCTL for key checked
guest absolute memory access
On 19/01/2022 13.46, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
>
>
> Am 19.01.22 um 12:52 schrieb Thomas Huth:
>> On 18/01/2022 10.52, Janis Schoetterl-Glausch wrote:
>>> Channel I/O honors storage keys and is performed on absolute memory.
>>> For I/O emulation user space therefore needs to be able to do key
>>> checked accesses.
>>
>> Can't we do the checking in userspace? We already have functions for
>> handling the storage keys there (see hw/s390x/s390-skeys-kvm.c), so why
>> can't we do the checking in QEMU?
>
> That would separate the key check from the memory operation. Potentially for
> a long time.
> Wenn we piggy back on access_guest_abs_with_key we use mvcos in the host and
> thus do the key check in lockstep with the keycheck which is the preferrable
> solution.
Ok, makes sense - Janis, could you please add this rationale to the patch
description?
Thomas
Powered by blists - more mailing lists