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Date:   Sat, 22 Jan 2022 09:47:38 +0100
From:   Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Zero host's SYSENTER_ESP iff SYSENTER is NOT
 used

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> writes:

> Zero vmcs.HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP when initializing *constant* host state
> if and only if SYSENTER cannot be used, i.e. the kernel is a 64-bit
> kernel and is not emulating 32-bit syscalls.  As the name suggests,
> vmx_set_constant_host_state() is intended for state that is *constant*.
> When SYSENTER is used, SYSENTER_ESP isn't constant because stacks are
> per-CPU, and the VMCS must be updated whenever the vCPU is migrated to a
> new CPU.  The logic in vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs() doesn't differentiate between
> "never loaded" and "loaded on a different CPU", i.e. setting SYSENTER_ESP
> on VMCS load also handles setting correct host state when the VMCS is
> first loaded.
>
> Because a VMCS must be loaded before it is initialized during vCPU RESET,
> zeroing the field in vmx_set_constant_host_state() obliterates the value
> that was written when the VMCS was loaded.  If the vCPU is run before it
> is migrated, the subsequent VM-Exit will zero out MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
> leading to a #DF on the next 32-bit syscall.
>
>   double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
>   CPU: 0 PID: 990 Comm: stable Not tainted 5.16.0+ #97
>   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
>   EIP: entry_SYSENTER_32+0x0/0xe7
>   Code: <9c> 50 eb 17 0f 20 d8 a9 00 10 00 00 74 0d 25 ff ef ff ff 0f 22 d8
>   EAX: 000000a2 EBX: a8d1300c ECX: a8d13014 EDX: 00000000
>   ESI: a8f87000 EDI: a8d13014 EBP: a8d12fc0 ESP: 00000000
>   DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00210093
>   CR0: 80050033 CR2: fffffffc CR3: 02c3b000 CR4: 00152e90
>
> Fixes: 6ab8a4053f71 ("KVM: VMX: Avoid to rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP)")
> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 9 ++++++---
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index a02a28ce7cc3..ce2aae12fcc5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -4094,10 +4094,13 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>  	vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * If 32-bit syscall is enabled, vmx_vcpu_load_vcms rewrites
> -	 * HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP.
> +	 * SYSENTER is used only for (emulating) 32-bit kernels, zero out
> +	 * SYSENTER.ESP if it is NOT used.  When SYSENTER is used, the per-CPU
> +	 * stack is set when the VMCS is loaded (and may already be set!).

For an unprepared reader, I'd suggest adding something like "This pairs
with how HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP is written in vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs()".

>  	 */
> -	vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))

Isn't it the same as "!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT_32)"? (same goes to the
check in vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs())

> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
> +
>  	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
>  	vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);   /* 22.2.3 */
>  

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>

-- 
Vitaly

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