linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/perf: Default freeze_on

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <7ef1bf66-4184-7f5b-c0bd-351ec743d4e9@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 25 Jan 2022 08:57:09 -0500
From:   "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Robert O'Callahan <rocallahan@...il.com>,
        Keno Fischer <keno@...iacomputing.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/perf: Default freeze_on_smi on for Comet Lake and
 later.



On 1/24/2022 9:59 PM, Kyle Huey wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 24, 2022 at 8:01 AM Liang, Kan <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/24/2022 7:21 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 11:26:44PM -0800, Kyle Huey wrote:
>>>> Beginning in Comet Lake, Intel extended the concept of privilege rings to
>>>> SMM.[0] A side effect of this is that events caused by execution of code
>>>> in SMM are now visible to performance counters with IA32_PERFEVTSELx.USR
>>>> set.
>>>>
>>>> rr[1] depends on exact counts of performance events for the user space
>>>> tracee, so this change in behavior is fatal for us. It is, however, easily
>>>> corrected by setting IA32_DEBUGCTL.FREEZE_WHILE_SMM to 1 (visible in sysfs
>>>> as /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi). While we can and will tell our users to
>>>> set freeze_on_smi manually when appropriate, because observing events in
>>>> SMM is rarely useful to anyone, we propose to change the default value of
>>>> this switch.
>>
>> + Andi
>>
>>   From we heard many times from sophisticated customers, they really hate
>> blind spots. They want to see everything. That's why we set
>> freeze_on_smi to 0 as default. I think the patch breaks the principle.
> 
> The default kernel settings for perf events prioritize preventing
> information leaks to less privileged code. perf_event_paranoid
> defaults to 2, preventing unprivileged users from observing kernel
> space. If "sophisticated customers" want to see everything they have
> already needed privileges (or an explicit opt-in through decreasing
> perf_event_paranoid) for some time.
> 
> The current situation on Comet Lake+ where an unprivileged user
> *cannot* observe kernel code due to security concerns but
> simultaneously *must* observe SMM code seems rather absurd.
>

I see. I was thought the unprivileged user can observe the SMM code on 
the previous platforms. The CML+ change only makes part of the SMM code 
CPL0. Seems I'm wrong. The change looks like changing the previous CPL0 
code to CPL3 code. If so, yes, I think we should prevent the information 
leaks for the unprivileged user.

>> I don't think there is a way to notify all the users that the default
>> kernel value will be changed. (Yes, the end user can always check the
>> /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi to get the latest value. But in practice,
>> no one checks it unless some errors found.) I think it may bring
>> troubles to the users if they rely on the counts in SMM.
> 
> Unfortunately the new hardware has already changed the behavior
> without notifying users, no matter what we do here.
> 
>> The patch only changes the default values for some platforms, not all
>> platforms. The default value is not consistent among platforms anymore.
>> It can bring confusion.
> 
> I don't personally object to changing freeze_on_smi for all platforms
> :) I was merely trying to limit the changes.


Changing it to all platforms seems a too big hammer. I agree we should 
limit it to the impacted platforms.

I've contacted the author of the white paper. I was told that the change 
is for the client vPro platforms. They are not sure whether it impacts 
Server platform or Atom platforms. I'm still working on it. I will let 
you and Peter know once I get more information.

Thanks,
Kan