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Message-ID: <164320382890.16921.15972452029466338129.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 13:30:28 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Waiman Long" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: locking/core] locking/lockdep: Avoid potential access of
invalid memory in lock_class
The following commit has been merged into the locking/core branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 61cc4534b6550997c97a03759ab46b29d44c0017
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/61cc4534b6550997c97a03759ab46b29d44c0017
Author: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
AuthorDate: Sun, 02 Jan 2022 21:35:58 -05:00
Committer: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 22:30:28 +01:00
locking/lockdep: Avoid potential access of invalid memory in lock_class
It was found that reading /proc/lockdep after a lockdep splat may
potentially cause an access to freed memory if lockdep_unregister_key()
is called after the splat but before access to /proc/lockdep [1]. This
is due to the fact that graph_lock() call in lockdep_unregister_key()
fails after the clearing of debug_locks by the splat process.
After lockdep_unregister_key() is called, the lock_name may be freed
but the corresponding lock_class structure still have a reference to
it. That invalid memory pointer will then be accessed when /proc/lockdep
is read by a user and a use-after-free (UAF) error will be reported if
KASAN is enabled.
To fix this problem, lockdep_unregister_key() is now modified to always
search for a matching key irrespective of the debug_locks state and
zap the corresponding lock class if a matching one is found.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/77f05c15-81b6-bddd-9650-80d5f23fe330@i-love.sakura.ne.jp/
Fixes: 8b39adbee805 ("locking/lockdep: Make lockdep_unregister_key() honor 'debug_locks' again")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220103023558.1377055-1-longman@redhat.com
---
kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
index 89b3df5..2e6892e 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
@@ -6287,7 +6287,13 @@ void lockdep_reset_lock(struct lockdep_map *lock)
lockdep_reset_lock_reg(lock);
}
-/* Unregister a dynamically allocated key. */
+/*
+ * Unregister a dynamically allocated key.
+ *
+ * Unlike lockdep_register_key(), a search is always done to find a matching
+ * key irrespective of debug_locks to avoid potential invalid access to freed
+ * memory in lock_class entry.
+ */
void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
{
struct hlist_head *hash_head = keyhashentry(key);
@@ -6302,10 +6308,8 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
return;
raw_local_irq_save(flags);
- if (!graph_lock())
- goto out_irq;
+ lockdep_lock();
- pf = get_pending_free();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(k, hash_head, hash_entry) {
if (k == key) {
hlist_del_rcu(&k->hash_entry);
@@ -6313,11 +6317,13 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
break;
}
}
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!found);
- __lockdep_free_key_range(pf, key, 1);
- call_rcu_zapped(pf);
- graph_unlock();
-out_irq:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!found && debug_locks);
+ if (found) {
+ pf = get_pending_free();
+ __lockdep_free_key_range(pf, key, 1);
+ call_rcu_zapped(pf);
+ }
+ lockdep_unlock();
raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
/* Wait until is_dynamic_key() has finished accessing k->hash_entry. */
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