[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20220127184614.2837938-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 19:46:13 +0100
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
To: <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
<stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>, <linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH v3a 09/11] ima: Add support for fsverity signatures
Since fsverity signatures are in PKCS#7 format, handle them as the same as
kernel modules, using the modsig code.
The main differences with modsig are: ima_read_fsverity_sig() gets the
fsverity signature with fsverity_get_signature() instead of getting it from
the file content; ima_collect_fsverity() gets the data to be hashed from
fsverity_get_formatted_digest(), instead of hashing the file content.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 10 ++++
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 7 ++-
include/linux/evm.h | 5 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 19 ++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 38 ++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 ++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 444bb7ccbe03..8602f08d06bb 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@ Description:
appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
+ Example of measure and appraise rules allowing fs-verity
+ signed digests on a particular filesystem identified by
+ it's fsuuid:
+
+ measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=hash|verity \
+ fsuuid=... template=ima-modsig
+ appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=hash|verity \
+ ima_appraise_type=imasig fsuuid=...
+
+
Example of measure rule allowing fs-verity's digests on a
particular filesystem with indication of type of digest.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
index 5e31513e8ec4..96654e72a36e 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
@@ -68,11 +68,12 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
- - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
+ - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig, or the
+ digest of an fsverity formatted digest;
- 'd-type': the type of file digest (e.g. hash, verity[1]);
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
- - 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file
- signature is not found;
+ - 'sig': the file signature, based on either the file's/fsverity's digest[1],
+ or the EVM portable signature if the file signature is not found;
- 'modsig' the appended file signature;
- 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations;
- 'evmsig': the EVM portable signature;
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 4c374be70247..3da25393b011 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@
struct integrity_iint_cache;
+static inline bool evm_protects_fsverity(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
extern int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen);
extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 78395bed7fad..4a45a7b5743b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -380,26 +380,45 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+bool ima_modsig_is_verity(const struct modsig *modsig);
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
struct modsig **modsig);
+int ima_read_fsverity_sig(struct inode *inode, struct modsig **modsig);
void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
+void ima_collect_fsverity(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size);
int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
u32 *data_len);
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else
+static inline bool ima_modsig_is_verity(const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+static inline int ima_read_fsverity_sig(struct inode *inode,
+ struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
loff_t size)
{
}
+static inline void ima_collect_fsverity(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
+ loff_t size)
+{
+}
+
static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig,
enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **digest,
u32 *digest_size)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 8760c4874f7d..369f2222dd55 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -201,23 +201,6 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
allowed_algos);
}
-static int ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct ima_digest_data *hash)
-{
- u8 verity_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
- enum hash_algo verity_alg;
- int rc;
-
- rc = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, verity_digest, &verity_alg);
- if (rc)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (hash->algo != verity_alg)
- return -EINVAL;
- hash->length = hash_digest_size[verity_alg];
- memcpy(hash->digest, verity_digest, hash->length);
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
*
@@ -249,8 +232,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
* the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous
* measurement rule.
*/
- if (modsig)
- ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+ if (modsig) {
+ if (!ima_modsig_is_verity(modsig))
+ ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+ else
+ ima_collect_fsverity(modsig, buf, size);
+ }
if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
goto out;
@@ -266,14 +253,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
- if (buf) {
+ if (buf && !(iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_DIGEST)) {
result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
- } else if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_ALLOWED) {
- result = ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash.hdr);
- if (result < 0)
- result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
- else
- iint->flags |= IMA_VERITY_DIGEST;
+ } else if (buf && (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_DIGEST)) {
+ hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
+ memcpy(hash.hdr.digest,
+ ((struct fsverity_formatted_digest *)buf)->digest,
+ hash_digest_size[algo]);
} else {
result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..f8dde59e64f5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, modsig);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
- func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK && !ima_modsig_is_verity(modsig))
rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
modsig);
if (rc) {
@@ -333,6 +333,50 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * fsverity_verify - verify fsverity signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the fsverity signature is valid.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int fsverity_verify(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ const struct modsig *modsig,
+ enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!modsig || !ima_modsig_is_verity(modsig)) {
+ if (!evm_protects_fsverity()) {
+ *cause = "EVM-fsverity-not-protected";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ } else {
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * EVM already verified the actual fsverity digest, nothing else
+ * is required.
+ */
+ *status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ rc = modsig_verify(NONE, modsig, status, cause);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* ima_check_blacklist - determine if the binary is blacklisted.
*
@@ -352,7 +396,8 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
return 0;
- if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig &&
+ !ima_modsig_is_verity(modsig)) {
ima_get_modsig_digest(modsig, &hash_algo, &digest, &digestsize);
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
@@ -385,14 +430,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
int rc = xattr_len;
- bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig;
+ bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig &&
+ !ima_modsig_is_verity(modsig);
+ bool try_fsverity = iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_DIGEST;
- /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */
- if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig)
+ /* If not appraising a modsig or an fsverity file, we need an xattr. */
+ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig && !try_fsverity)
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
/* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */
- if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) {
+ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig && !try_fsverity) {
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
@@ -446,6 +493,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
rc == -ENOKEY))
rc = modsig_verify(func, modsig, &status, &cause);
+ /*
+ * If we have a fsverity sig, no modsig and no imasig, then try
+ * verifying the fsverity sig.
+ */
+ if (try_fsverity)
+ rc = fsverity_verify(iint, modsig, &status, &cause);
out:
/*
* File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
@@ -463,7 +516,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && !try_modsig &&
- (!xattr_value ||
+ !try_fsverity && (!xattr_value ||
xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 774accb62275..1f78f31c3e89 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -216,6 +217,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
+ u8 fsverity_buf[FS_VERITY_MAX_FMT_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ ssize_t fsverity_buf_len;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -330,9 +333,38 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
action |= IMA_MEASURE;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Read the fsverity sig if allowed by the policy, and allow
+ * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
+ * template format and whether the file was already measured.
+ */
+ if (!modsig && IS_VERITY(inode) &&
+ (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_ALLOWED)) {
+ rc = ima_read_fsverity_sig(inode, &modsig);
+
+ if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
+ iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+ action |= IMA_MEASURE;
+ }
}
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ /*
+ * Fsverity verification method is enabled only if all others are not
+ * available.
+ */
+ if (IS_VERITY(inode) && (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_ALLOWED) &&
+ !xattr_value && (!modsig || ima_modsig_is_verity(modsig))) {
+ fsverity_buf_len = fsverity_get_formatted_digest(inode,
+ fsverity_buf,
+ &hash_algo);
+ if (fsverity_buf_len > 0) {
+ buf = fsverity_buf;
+ size = fsverity_buf_len;
+ iint->flags |= IMA_VERITY_DIGEST;
+ }
+ }
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index fb25723c65bc..66c19846477c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@
#include "ima.h"
struct modsig {
+ bool is_verity;
+
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -32,6 +35,11 @@ struct modsig {
u8 raw_pkcs7[];
};
+bool ima_modsig_is_verity(const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ return modsig->is_verity;
+}
+
/*
* ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
*
@@ -87,6 +95,51 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * ima_read_fsverity_sig - Read fsverity sig from inode.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_read_fsverity_sig(struct inode *inode, struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+ struct modsig *hdr;
+ u8 *signature;
+ ssize_t signature_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ signature_size = fsverity_get_signature(inode, &signature);
+ if (signature_size < 0)
+ return signature_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate signature_size additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data.
+ */
+ hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + signature_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hdr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ hdr->pkcs7_msg = pkcs7_parse_message(signature, signature_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg);
+ kfree(hdr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7, signature, signature_size);
+ hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = signature_size;
+
+ /* We don't know the hash algorithm yet. */
+ hdr->hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
+ hdr->is_verity = true;
+
+ *modsig = hdr;
+out:
+ kfree(signature);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* ima_collect_modsig - Calculate the file hash without the appended signature.
*
@@ -113,6 +166,28 @@ void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size)
&modsig->digest_size, &modsig->hash_algo);
}
+/**
+ * ima_collect_fsverity - Calculate the digest of the fsverity formatted digest.
+ *
+ * Pass the same data used to verify the fsverity signature in
+ * fs/verity/signature.c.
+ */
+void ima_collect_fsverity(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = pkcs7_supply_detached_data(modsig->pkcs7_msg, buf, size);
+ if (rc)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Ask the PKCS7 code to calculate the digest of the fsverity formatted
+ * digest.
+ */
+ rc = pkcs7_get_digest(modsig->pkcs7_msg, &modsig->digest,
+ &modsig->digest_size, &modsig->hash_algo);
+}
+
int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
{
return verify_pkcs7_message_sig(NULL, 0, modsig->pkcs7_msg, keyring,
--
2.32.0
Powered by blists - more mailing lists