linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 4/5] x86/uaccess: Implement unsafe_try_cmpxchg

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Message-ID: <YfJsIDw+GwjZDiX3@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date:   Thu, 27 Jan 2022 10:55:44 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, juri.lelli@...hat.com,
        vincent.guittot@...aro.org, dietmar.eggemann@....com,
        rostedt@...dmis.org, bsegall@...gle.com, mgorman@...e.de,
        bristot@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        pjt@...gle.com, posk@...gle.com, avagin@...gle.com,
        jannh@...gle.com, tdelisle@...terloo.ca, mark.rutland@....com,
        posk@...k.io
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 4/5] x86/uaccess: Implement
 unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user()

On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 02:17:20AM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 20, 2022, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > Do try_cmpxchg() loops on userspace addresses.
> > 
> > Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h |   67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 67 insertions(+)
> > 
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -342,6 +342,24 @@ do {									\
> >  		     : [umem] "m" (__m(addr))				\
> >  		     : : label)
> >  
> > +#define __try_cmpxchg_user_asm(itype, ltype, _ptr, _pold, _new, label)	({ \
> > +	bool success;							\
> > +	__typeof__(_ptr) _old = (__typeof__(_ptr))(_pold);		\
> > +	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __old = *_old;				\
> > +	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __new = (_new);				\
> > +	asm_volatile_goto("\n"						\
> > +		     "1: " LOCK_PREFIX "cmpxchg"itype" %[new], %[ptr]\n"\
> > +		     _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, %l[label])			\
> > +		     : CC_OUT(z) (success),				\
> > +		       [ptr] "+m" (*_ptr),				\
> > +		       [old] "+a" (__old)				\
> > +		     : [new] ltype (__new)				\
> > +		     : "memory", "cc"					\
> 
> IIUC, the "cc" clobber is unnecessary as CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT=y implies
> __GCC_ASM_FLAG_OUTPUTS__=y, i.e. CC_OUT() will resolve to "=@cc".

Yeah, even without that GCC always assumes 'cc' is clobbered due to
hysterical raisins.

> > +		     : label);						\
> > +	if (unlikely(!success))						\
> > +		*_old = __old;						\
> > +	likely(success);					})
> > +
> >  #else // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
> 
> ...
> 
> > +extern void __try_cmpxchg_user_wrong_size(void);
> > +
> > +#define unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label) ({		\
> > +	__typeof__(*(_ptr)) __ret;					\
> 
> This should probably be a bool, the return from the lower level helpers is a bool
> that's true if the exchange succeed.  Declaring the type of the target implies
> that they return the raw result, which is confusing.

Fair enough.

> > +	switch (sizeof(__ret)) {					\
> > +	case 1:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("b", "q",		\
> > +					       (_ptr), (_oldp),		\
> > +					       (_nval), _label);	\
> > +		break;							\
> > +	case 2:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("w", "r",		\
> > +					       (_ptr), (_oldp),		\
> > +					       (_nval), _label);	\
> > +		break;							\
> > +	case 4:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("l", "r",		\
> > +					       (_ptr), (_oldp),		\
> > +					       (_nval), _label);	\
> > +		break;							\
> > +	case 8:	__ret = __try_cmpxchg_user_asm("q", "r",		\
> > +					       (_ptr), (_oldp),		\
> > +					       (_nval), _label);	\
> 
> Doh, I should have specified that KVM needs 8-byte CMPXCHG on 32-bit kernels due
> to using it to atomically update guest PAE PTEs and LTR descriptors (yay).

:-) I'm so trying to de-feature 32bit.

> Also, KVM's use case isn't a tight loop, how gross would it be to add a slightly
> less unsafe version that does __uaccess_begin_nospec()?  KVM pre-checks the address
> way ahead of time, so the access_ok() check can be omitted.  Alternatively, KVM
> could add its own macro, but that seems a little silly.  E.g. somethign like this,
> though I don't think this is correct (something is getting inverted somewhere and
> the assembly output is a nightmare):
> 
> /* "Returns" 0 on success, 1 on failure, -EFAULT if the access faults. */
> #define ___try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label)	({		\
> 	int ____ret = -EFAULT;						\
> 	__uaccess_begin_nospec();					\
> 	____ret = !unsafe_try_cmpxchg_user(_ptr, _oldp, _nval, _label);	\
> _label:									\
> 	__uaccess_end();						\
> 	____ret;							\
> 						})

Works for me I suppose, but we really ought to keep usage of that in
arch code.

> Lastly, assuming I get my crap working, mind if I post a variant (Cc'd to stable@) in
> the context of KVM series?  

Not at all.