linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/2] selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts

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Date:   Thu, 27 Jan 2022 21:25:17 -0500
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc:     Scott Mayhew <smayhew@...hat.com>,
        SElinux list <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-nfs <linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/2] selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()

On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 4:54 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
> I wonder if we could make this all much simpler by *always* doing the
> label parsing in selinux_add_opt() and just returning an error when
> !selinux_initialized(&selinux_state). Before the new mount API, mount
> options were always passed directly to the mount(2) syscall, so it
> wasn't possible to pass any SELinux mount options before the SELinux
> policy was loaded. I don't see why we need to jump through hoops here
> just to support this pseudo-feature of stashing an unparsed label into
> an fs_context before policy is loaded... Userspace should never need
> to do that.

I could agree with that, although part of my mind is a little nervous
about the "userspace should *never* ..." because that always seems to
bite us.  Although I'm struggling to think of a case where userspace
would need to set explicit SELinux mount options without having a
policy loaded.

-- 
paul-moore.com