Date:   Fri, 28 Jan 2022 11:17:59 -0600
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>
CC:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        <brijesh.ksingh@...il.com>, <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        <marcorr@...gle.com>, <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests

From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>

SEV-SNP guests will be provided the location of special 'secrets' and
'CPUID' pages via the Confidential Computing blob. This blob is
provided to the run-time kernel either through a bootparams field that
was initialized by the boot/compressed kernel, or via a setup_data
structure as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol.

Locate the Confidential Computing blob from these sources and, if found,
use the provided CPUID page/table address to create a copy that the
run-time kernel will use when servicing CPUID instructions via a #VC
handler.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 37 -----------------
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c   | 37 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c          | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index cde5658e1007..21cdafac71e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -393,43 +393,6 @@ static struct cc_blob_sev_info *snp_find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
 	return cc_info;
 }
 
-/*
- * Initialize the kernel's copy of the SEV-SNP CPUID table, and set up the
- * pointer that will be used to access it.
- *
- * Maintaining a direct mapping of the SEV-SNP CPUID table used by firmware
- * would be possible as an alternative, but the approach is brittle since the
- * mapping needs to be updated in sync with all the changes to virtual memory
- * layout and related mapping facilities throughout the boot process.
- */
-static void snp_setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
-{
-	const struct snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info_fw, *cpuid_info;
-	int i;
-
-	if (!cc_info || !cc_info->cpuid_phys || cc_info->cpuid_len < PAGE_SIZE)
-		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
-
-	cpuid_info_fw = (const struct snp_cpuid_info *)cc_info->cpuid_phys;
-	if (!cpuid_info_fw->count || cpuid_info_fw->count > SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX)
-		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
-
-	cpuid_info = snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr();
-	memcpy((void *)cpuid_info, cpuid_info_fw, sizeof(*cpuid_info));
-
-	/* Initialize CPUID ranges for range-checking. */
-	for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
-		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
-
-		if (fn->eax_in == 0x0)
-			cpuid_std_range_max = fn->eax;
-		else if (fn->eax_in == 0x40000000)
-			cpuid_hyp_range_max = fn->eax;
-		else if (fn->eax_in == 0x80000000)
-			cpuid_ext_range_max = fn->eax;
-	}
-}
-
 bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index 2bddbfea079b..795426ee6108 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -961,3 +961,40 @@ static struct cc_blob_sev_info *snp_find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *
 
 	return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)(unsigned long)sd->cc_blob_address;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the kernel's copy of the SEV-SNP CPUID table, and set up the
+ * pointer that will be used to access it.
+ *
+ * Maintaining a direct mapping of the SEV-SNP CPUID table used by firmware
+ * would be possible as an alternative, but the approach is brittle since the
+ * mapping needs to be updated in sync with all the changes to virtual memory
+ * layout and related mapping facilities throughout the boot process.
+ */
+static void __init snp_setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
+{
+	const struct snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info_fw, *cpuid_info;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!cc_info || !cc_info->cpuid_phys || cc_info->cpuid_len < PAGE_SIZE)
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
+
+	cpuid_info_fw = (const struct snp_cpuid_info *)cc_info->cpuid_phys;
+	if (!cpuid_info_fw->count || cpuid_info_fw->count > SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX)
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
+
+	cpuid_info = snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr();
+	memcpy((void *)cpuid_info, cpuid_info_fw, sizeof(*cpuid_info));
+
+	/* Initialize CPUID ranges for range-checking. */
+	for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
+		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
+
+		if (fn->eax_in == 0x0)
+			cpuid_std_range_max = fn->eax;
+		else if (fn->eax_in == 0x40000000)
+			cpuid_hyp_range_max = fn->eax;
+		else if (fn->eax_in == 0x80000000)
+			cpuid_ext_range_max = fn->eax;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 5c72b21c7e7b..cb97200bfda7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -2034,6 +2034,8 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 	if (!cc_info)
 		return false;
 
+	snp_setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
+
 	/*
 	 * The CC blob will be used later to access the secrets page. Cache
 	 * it here like the boot kernel does.
@@ -2047,3 +2049,76 @@ void __init snp_abort(void)
 {
 	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
 }
+
+static void snp_dump_cpuid_table(void)
+{
+	const struct snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info = snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr();
+	int i = 0;
+
+	pr_info("count=%d reserved=0x%x reserved2=0x%llx\n",
+		cpuid_info->count, cpuid_info->__reserved1, cpuid_info->__reserved2);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX; i++) {
+		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
+
+		pr_info("index=%03d fn=0x%08x subfn=0x%08x: eax=0x%08x ebx=0x%08x ecx=0x%08x edx=0x%08x xcr0_in=0x%016llx xss_in=0x%016llx reserved=0x%016llx\n",
+			i, fn->eax_in, fn->ecx_in, fn->eax, fn->ebx, fn->ecx,
+			fn->edx, fn->xcr0_in, fn->xss_in, fn->__reserved);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * It is useful from an auditing/testing perspective to provide an easy way
+ * for the guest owner to know that the CPUID table has been initialized as
+ * expected, but that initialization happens too early in boot to print any
+ * sort of indicator, and there's not really any other good place to do it.
+ * So do it here. This is also a good place to flag unexpected usage of the
+ * CPUID table that does not violate the SNP specification, but may still
+ * be worth noting to the user.
+ */
+static int __init snp_check_cpuid_table(void)
+{
+	const struct snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info = snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr();
+	bool dump_table = false;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!cpuid_info->count)
+		return 0;
+
+	pr_info("Using SEV-SNP CPUID table, %d entries present.\n",
+		cpuid_info->count);
+
+	if (cpuid_info->__reserved1 || cpuid_info->__reserved2) {
+		pr_warn("Unexpected use of reserved fields in CPUID table header.\n");
+		dump_table = true;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
+		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
+		struct snp_cpuid_fn zero_fn = {0};
+
+		/*
+		 * Though allowed, an all-zero entry is not a valid leaf for linux
+		 * guests, and likely the result of an incorrect entry count.
+		 */
+		if (!memcmp(fn, &zero_fn, sizeof(struct snp_cpuid_fn))) {
+			pr_warn("CPUID table contains all-zero entry at index=%d\n", i);
+			dump_table = true;
+		}
+
+		if (fn->__reserved) {
+			pr_warn("Unexpected use of reserved fields in CPUID table entry at index=%d\n",
+				i);
+			dump_table = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (dump_table) {
+		pr_warn("Dumping CPUID table:\n");
+		snp_dump_cpuid_table();
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+arch_initcall(snp_check_cpuid_table);
-- 
2.25.1

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