linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: pass TME information to guests

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Message-ID: <6c55ac92-0470-07ba-77c0-4701c4ea7ce3@intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 3 Feb 2022 10:40:50 -0800
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Fares Mehanna <faresx@...zon.de>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@...el.com>,
        "Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: pass TME information to guests

On 2/3/22 10:14, Fares Mehanna wrote:
> This will guarantee that hardware supports TME, MSRs are locked, so host can't
> change them and exclusion range is disabled, so TME rules apply on all host
> memory.

But, what's the point?  Guests can't trust this information.  The host
can lie all it wants about it.

Also, your assumptions about TME rules applying to *all* host memory are
a bit aggressive.

Even if the guest knew for sure that it was reading an MSR directly, it
doesn't mean that any guest memory is actually TME-protected.  The
memory could be from a non-TME range like persistent memory.  There are
some weasel words in the spec about this:

> Upon activation, all memory (except in TME Exclusion range) attached
> to CPU/SoC is encrypted using AES-XTS 128 bit ephemeral key (platform
> key) that is generated by the CPU on every boot.

The important part here is "attached to the CPU/SoC".  I guess they
don't count persistent memory as "attached".  This also obviously would
not apply to non-CPU-attached memory that was attached by something like
CXL[1].

The extra fun part of all this is that the architecture doesn't provide
a way to tell if the memory is "attached to the CPU/SoC".  That makes it
impossible to get any guarantees out of all this.

In other words, you can't trust the exclusion range in the MSR to be the
*ONLY* non-TME-protected area.

1. https://www.computeexpresslink.org/