Message-ID: <9f948745435c4c9273131146d50fe6f328b91a78.camel@intel.com>
Date:   Sat, 5 Feb 2022 20:15:01 +0000
From:   "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To:     "hjl.tools@...il.com" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        "David.Laight@...lab.com" <David.Laight@...lab.com>
CC:     "bsingharora@...il.com" <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Syromiatnikov, Eugene" <esyr@...hat.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "rdunlap@...radead.org" <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Eranian, Stephane" <eranian@...gle.com>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "fweimer@...hat.com" <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "nadav.amit@...il.com" <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        "jannh@...gle.com" <jannh@...gle.com>,
        "kcc@...gle.com" <kcc@...gle.com>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "pavel@....cz" <pavel@....cz>, "oleg@...hat.com" <oleg@...hat.com>,
        "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        "Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>,
        "Moreira, Joao" <joao.moreira@...el.com>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mike.kravetz@...cle.com" <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Dave.Martin@....com" <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        "john.allen@....com" <john.allen@....com>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        "gorcunov@...il.com" <gorcunov@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace

On Sat, 2022-02-05 at 05:29 -0800, H.J. Lu wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>
> wrote:
> > 
> > From: Edgecombe, Rick P
> > > Sent: 04 February 2022 01:08
> > > Hi Thomas,
> > > 
> > > Thanks for feedback on the plan.
> > > 
> > > On Thu, 2022-02-03 at 22:07 +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > > > Until now, the enabling effort was trying to support both
> > > > > Shadow
> > > > > Stack and IBT.
> > > > > This history will focus on a few areas of the shadow stack
> > > > > development history
> > > > > that I thought stood out.
> > > > > 
> > > > >        Signals
> > > > >        -------
> > > > >        Originally signals placed the location of the shadow
> > > > > stack
> > > > > restore
> > > > >        token inside the saved state on the stack. This was
> > > > > problematic from a
> > > > >        past ABI promises perspective. So the restore location
> > > > > was
> > > > > instead just
> > > > >        assumed from the shadow stack pointer. This works
> > > > > because in
> > > > > normal
> > > > >        allowed cases of calling sigreturn, the shadow stack
> > > > > pointer
> > > > > should be
> > > > >        right at the restore token at that time. There is no
> > > > > alternate shadow
> > > > >        stack support. If an alt shadow stack is added later
> > > > > we
> > > > > would
> > > > >        need to
> > > > 
> > > > So how is that going to work? altstack is not an esoteric
> > > > corner
> > > > case.
> > > 
> > > My understanding is that the main usages for the signal stack
> > > were
> > > handling stack overflows and corruption. Since the shadow stack
> > > only
> > > contains return addresses rather than large stack allocations,
> > > and is
> > > not generally writable or pivotable, I thought there was a good
> > > possibility an alt shadow stack would not end up being especially
> > > useful. Does it seem like reasonable guesswork?
> > 
> > The other 'problem' is that it is valid to longjump out of a signal
> > handler.
> > These days you have to use siglongjmp() not longjmp() but it is
> > still used.
> > 
> > It is probably also valid to use siglongjmp() to jump from a nested
> > signal handler into the outer handler.
> > Given both signal handlers can have their own stack, there can be
> > three
> > stacks involved.

So the scenario is?

1. Handle signal 1
2. sigsetjmp()
3. signalstack()
4. Handle signal 2 on alt stack
5. siglongjmp()

I'll check that it is covered by the tests, but I think it should work
in this series that has no alt shadow stack. I have only done a high
level overview of how the shadow stack stuff, that doesn't involve the
kernel, works in glibc. Sounds like I'll need to do a deeper dive.

> > 
> > I think the shadow stack pointer has to be in ucontext - which also
> > means the application can change it before returning from a signal.

Yes we might need to change it to support alt shadow stacks. Can you
elaborate why you think it has to be in ucontext? I was thinking of
looking at three options for storing the ssp:
 - Stored in the shadow stack like a token using WRUSS from the kernel.
 - Stored on the kernel side using a hashmap that maps ucontext or
   sigframe userspace address to ssp (this is of course similar to 
   storing in ucontext, except that the user can’t change the ssp).
 - Stored writable in userspace in ucontext.

But in this version, without alt shadow stacks, the shadow stack
pointer is not stored in ucontext. This causes the limitation that
userspace can only call sigreturn when it has returned back to a point
where there is a restore token on the shadow stack (which was placed
there by the kernel). This doesn’t mean it can’t switch to a different
shadow stack or handle a nested signal, but it limits the possibility
for calling sigreturn with a totally different sigframe (like CRIU and
SROP attacks do). It should hopefully be a helpful, protective
limitation for most apps and I'm hoping CRIU can be fixed without
removing it.

I am not aware of other limitations to signals (besides normal shadow
stack enforcement), but I could be missing it. And people's skepticism
is making me want to go back over it with more scrutiny.

> > In much the same way as all the segment registers can be changed
> > leading to all the nasty bugs when the final 'return to user' code
> > traps in kernel when loading invalid segment registers or executing
> > iret.

I don't think this is as difficult to avoid because userspace ssp has
its own register that should not be accessed at that point, but I have
not given this aspect enough analysis. Thanks for bringing it up.

> > 
> > Hmmm... do shadow stacks mean that longjmp() has to be a system
> > call?
> 
> No.  setjmp/longjmp save and restore shadow stack pointer.
> 

It sounds like it would help to write up in a lot more detail exactly
how all the signal and specialer stack manipulation scenarios work in
glibc.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists