linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.15 096/110] x86/perf: Default set FREEZE_ON

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Message-Id: <20220207103805.641038111@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  7 Feb 2022 12:07:09 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>,
        Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>, stable@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 096/110] x86/perf: Default set FREEZE_ON_SMI for all

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>

commit a01994f5e5c79d3a35e5e8cf4252c7f2147323c3 upstream.

Kyle reported that rr[0] has started to malfunction on Comet Lake and
later CPUs due to EFI starting to make use of CPL3 [1] and the PMU
event filtering not distinguishing between regular CPL3 and SMM CPL3.

Since this is a privilege violation, default disable SMM visibility
where possible.

Administrators wanting to observe SMM cycles can easily change this
using the sysfs attribute while regular users don't have access to
this file.

[0] https://rr-project.org/

[1] See the Intel white paper "Trustworthy SMM on the Intel vPro Platform"
at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=300300, particularly the
end of page 5.

Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@...rix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: stable@...nel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YfKChjX61OW4CkYm@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/core.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -4654,6 +4654,19 @@ static __initconst const struct x86_pmu
 	.lbr_read		= intel_pmu_lbr_read_64,
 	.lbr_save		= intel_pmu_lbr_save,
 	.lbr_restore		= intel_pmu_lbr_restore,
+
+	/*
+	 * SMM has access to all 4 rings and while traditionally SMM code only
+	 * ran in CPL0, 2021-era firmware is starting to make use of CPL3 in SMM.
+	 *
+	 * Since the EVENTSEL.{USR,OS} CPL filtering makes no distinction
+	 * between SMM or not, this results in what should be pure userspace
+	 * counters including SMM data.
+	 *
+	 * This is a clear privilege issue, therefore globally disable
+	 * counting SMM by default.
+	 */
+	.attr_freeze_on_smi	= 1,
 };
 
 static __init void intel_clovertown_quirk(void)