[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <87sfstvjh9.ffs@tglx>
Date: Tue, 08 Feb 2022 09:41:06 +0100
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
joao.moreira@...el.com, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
kcc@...gle.com, eranian@...gle.com
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
On Mon, Feb 07 2022 at 14:39, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 1/30/22 13:18, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
>> +config X86_SHADOW_STACK
>> + prompt "Intel Shadow Stack"
>> + def_bool n
>> + depends on AS_WRUSS
>> + depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>> + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
>> + help
>> + Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
>> + return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
>> + Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
>> + get protection "for free".
>> + Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
>> + processors released in 2020 or later. Enabling this feature
>> + increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
>
> I guess the "2020" comment is still OK. But, given that it's on AMD and
> a could of other Intel models, maybe we should just leave this at:
>
> CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
Yes.
> If we say anything. We mostly want folks to just go read the
> documentation if they needs more details.
Also the kernel text size increase blurb is pretty useless as that's a
number which is wrong from day one.
Thanks,
tglx
Powered by blists - more mailing lists