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Message-ID: <YgJLJJiosIOHLWYz@zn.tnic> Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 11:51:16 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>, brijesh.ksingh@...il.com, tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@...cle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 09:56:52AM +0200, Dov Murik wrote: > Just to be clear, I didn't mean necessarily "leak the key to the > untrusted host" (even if a page is converted back from private to > shared, it is encrypted, so host can't read its contents). But even > *inside* the guest, when dealing with sensitive data like keys, we > should minimize the amount of copies that float around (I assume this is > the reason for most of the uses of memzero_explicit() in the kernel). I don't know about Brijesh but I understood you exactly as you mean it. And yap, I agree we should always clear such sensitive buffers. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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