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Message-ID: <YgJrypdQium7AcWV@casper.infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 13:10:34 +0000
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@...onical.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
efi@...ts.einval.com,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
debian-kernel <debian-kernel@...ts.debian.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module
signing key
On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 12:01:22PM +0100, Julian Andres Klode wrote:
> It's worth pointing out that in Ubuntu, the generated MOK key
> is for module signing only (extended key usage 1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2),
> kernels signed with it will NOT be bootable.
Why should these be separate keys? There's no meaningful security
boundary between a kernel module and the ernel itself; a kernel
modulecan, for example, write to CR3, and that's game over for
any pretence at separation.
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