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Message-ID: <20220208145439.ozw4cjhqfvozewl4@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 08:54:39 -0600
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>, <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Srinivas Pandruvada" <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum" <tobin@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
"Andi Kleen" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
<brijesh.ksingh@...il.com>, <tony.luck@...el.com>,
<marcorr@...gle.com>, <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID
Enforcement
On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 11:48:11PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 28, 2022, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> >
> > Update the documentation with SEV-SNP CPUID enforcement.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> > ---
> > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> > index 1c6847fff304..0c72f44cc11a 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>
> This doc is specifically for KVM's host-side implemenation, whereas the below is
> (a) mostly targeted at the guest and (b) has nothing to do with KVM.
>
> Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst isn't a great fit either.
>
> Since TDX will need a fair bit of documentation, and SEV-ES could retroactively
> use docs as well, what about adding a sub-directory:
>
> Documentation/virt/confidential_compute
There's actually a Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst that was added
in this series as part of:
"virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver"
Maybe that's good choice?
I've been wondering about potentially adding the:
"Guest/Hypervisor Implementation Notes for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement"
document that was sent to SNP mailing list under Documentation/
somewhere. If we were to do that, it would be a good place to move the
documentation from this patch into as well. Any thoughts on that?
>
> to match the "cc_platform_has" stuffr, and then we can add sev.rst and tdx.rst
> there? Or sev-es.rst, sev-snp.rst, etc... if we want to split things up more.
>
> It might be worth extracting the SEV details from x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> into virt/ as well. A big chunk of that file appears to be SEV specific, and it
> appears to have gotten a little out-of-whack. E.g. this section no longer makes
> sense as the last paragraph below appears to be talking about SME (bit 23 in MSR
> 0xc0010010), but walking back "this bit" would reference SEV. I suspect a
> mostly-standalone sev.rst would be easier to follow than an intertwined SME+SEV.
>
> If support for SME is present, MSR 0xc00100010 (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG) can be used to
> determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption::
>
> 0xc0010010:
> Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
> 1 = memory encryption features are enabled
>
> If SEV is supported, MSR 0xc0010131 (MSR_AMD64_SEV) can be used to determine if
> SEV is active::
>
> 0xc0010131:
> Bit[0] 0 = memory encryption is not active
> 1 = memory encryption is active
>
> Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
> in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
> CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
> requirements for the system. If this bit is not set upon Linux startup then
> Linux itself will not set it and memory encryption will not be possible.
I'll check with Brijesh on these.
Thanks!
-Mike
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