linux-kernel - [PATCH MANUALSEL 5.16 4/8] KVM: nVMX: WARN on any attempt to allocate shadow VMCS for vmcs02

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Message-Id: <20220209185635.48730-4-sashal@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed,  9 Feb 2022 13:56:30 -0500
From:   Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, tglx@...utronix.de,
        mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH MANUALSEL 5.16 4/8] KVM: nVMX: WARN on any attempt to allocate shadow VMCS for vmcs02

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>

[ Upstream commit d6e656cd266cdcc95abd372c7faef05bee271d1a ]

WARN if KVM attempts to allocate a shadow VMCS for vmcs02.  KVM emulates
VMCS shadowing but doesn't virtualize it, i.e. KVM should never allocate
a "real" shadow VMCS for L2.

The previous code WARNed but continued anyway with the allocation,
presumably in an attempt to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
However, alloc_vmcs (and hence alloc_shadow_vmcs) can fail, and
indeed the sole caller does:

	if (enable_shadow_vmcs && !alloc_shadow_vmcs(vcpu))
		goto out_shadow_vmcs;

which makes it not a useful attempt.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Message-Id: <20220125220527.2093146-1-seanjc@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index c605c2c01394b..9cd68e1fcf602 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -4827,18 +4827,20 @@ static struct vmcs *alloc_shadow_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = vmx->loaded_vmcs;
 
 	/*
-	 * We should allocate a shadow vmcs for vmcs01 only when L1
-	 * executes VMXON and free it when L1 executes VMXOFF.
-	 * As it is invalid to execute VMXON twice, we shouldn't reach
-	 * here when vmcs01 already have an allocated shadow vmcs.
+	 * KVM allocates a shadow VMCS only when L1 executes VMXON and frees it
+	 * when L1 executes VMXOFF or the vCPU is forced out of nested
+	 * operation.  VMXON faults if the CPU is already post-VMXON, so it
+	 * should be impossible to already have an allocated shadow VMCS.  KVM
+	 * doesn't support virtualization of VMCS shadowing, so vmcs01 should
+	 * always be the loaded VMCS.
 	 */
-	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs == &vmx->vmcs01 && loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
+	if (WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01 || loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs))
+		return loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs;
+
+	loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = alloc_vmcs(true);
+	if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs)
+		vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
 
-	if (!loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs) {
-		loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = alloc_vmcs(true);
-		if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs)
-			vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
-	}
 	return loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs;
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1