linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAK7LNASNFnARmhJ0ik3uCiasuTDGgi9PtEgi7m+EPgHtK0-t5Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 10 Feb 2022 08:04:06 +0900
From:   Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>
To:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc:     Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@...onical.com>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
        efi@...ts.einval.com,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        debian-kernel <debian-kernel@...ts.debian.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module
 signing key

On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 10:21 PM James Bottomley
<James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2022-02-08 at 13:10 +0000, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 12:01:22PM +0100, Julian Andres Klode wrote:
> > > It's worth pointing out that in Ubuntu, the generated MOK key
> > > is for module signing only (extended key usage
> > > 1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2), kernels signed with it will NOT be
> > > bootable.
> >
> > Why should these be separate keys?  There's no meaningful security
> > boundary between a kernel module and the ernel itself; a kernel
> > modulecan, for example, write to CR3, and that's game over for
> > any pretence at separation.
>
> It's standard practice for any automated build private key to be
> destroyed immediately to preserve security.  Thus the modules get
> signed with a per kernel ephemeral build key but the MoK key is a long
> term key with a special signing infrastructure, usually burned into the
> distro version of shim.  The kernel signing key usually has to be long
> term because you want shim to boot multiple kernels otherwise upgrading
> becomes a nightmare.

Fully agreed.



-- 
Best Regards
Masahiro Yamada