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Date:   Wed, 9 Feb 2022 18:53:35 -0800
From:   "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Felix Willgerodt <felix.willgerodt@...el.com>
Cc:     "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        "gorcunov@...il.com" <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        "bsingharora@...il.com" <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Syromiatnikov, Eugene" <esyr@...hat.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "rdunlap@...radead.org" <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "0x7f454c46@...il.com" <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Eranian, Stephane" <eranian@...gle.com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "adrian@...as.de" <adrian@...as.de>,
        "fweimer@...hat.com" <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "nadav.amit@...il.com" <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        "jannh@...gle.com" <jannh@...gle.com>,
        "avagin@...il.com" <avagin@...il.com>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kcc@...gle.com" <kcc@...gle.com>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
        "oleg@...hat.com" <oleg@...hat.com>, "pavel@....cz" <pavel@....cz>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>,
        "Moreira, Joao" <joao.moreira@...el.com>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mike.kravetz@...cle.com" <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        "rppt@...nel.org" <rppt@...nel.org>,
        "Dave.Martin@....com" <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        "john.allen@....com" <john.allen@....com>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace

On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 6:37 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> On 2/8/22 18:18, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > On Tue, 2022-02-08 at 20:02 +0300, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> >> On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 08:21:20AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>>>> But such a knob will immediately reduce the security value of
> >>>>> the entire
> >>>>> thing, and I don't have good ideas how to deal with it :(
> >>>>
> >>>> Probably a kind of latch in the task_struct which would trigger
> >>>> off once
> >>>> returt to a different address happened, thus we would be able to
> >>>> jump inside
> >>>> paratite code. Of course such trigger should be available under
> >>>> proper
> >>>> capability only.
> >>>
> >>> I'm not fully in touch with how parasite, etc works.  Are we
> >>> talking about save or restore?
> >>
> >> We use parasite code in question during checkpoint phase as far as I
> >> remember.
> >> push addr/lret trick is used to run "injected" code (code injection
> >> itself is
> >> done via ptrace) in compat mode at least. Dima, Andrei, I didn't look
> >> into this code
> >> for years already, do we still need to support compat mode at all?
> >>
> >>> If it's restore, what exactly does CRIU need to do?  Is it just
> >>> that CRIU needs to return
> >>> out from its resume code into the to-be-resumed program without
> >>> tripping CET?  Would it
> >>> be acceptable for CRIU to require that at least one shstk slot be
> >>> free at save time?
> >>> Or do we need a mechanism to atomically switch to a completely full
> >>> shadow stack at resume?
> >>>
> >>> Off the top of my head, a sigreturn (or sigreturn-like mechanism)
> >>> that is intended for
> >>> use for altshadowstack could safely verify a token on the
> >>> altshdowstack, possibly
> >>> compare to something in ucontext (or not -- this isn't clearly
> >>> necessary) and switch
> >>> back to the previous stack.  CRIU could use that too.  Obviously
> >>> CRIU will need a way
> >>> to populate the relevant stacks, but WRUSS can be used for that,
> >>> and I think this
> >>> is a fundamental requirement for CRIU -- CRIU restore absolutely
> >>> needs a way to write
> >>> the saved shadow stack data into the shadow stack.
> >
> > Still wrapping my head around the CRIU save and restore steps, but
> > another general approach might be to give ptrace the ability to
> > temporarily pause/resume/set CET enablement and SSP for a stopped
> > thread. Then injected code doesn't need to jump through any hoops or
> > possibly run into road blocks. I'm not sure how much this opens things
> > up if the thread has to be stopped...
>
> Hmm, that's maybe not insane.
>
> An alternative would be to add a bona fide ptrace call-a-function
> mechanism.  I can think of two potentially usable variants:
>
> 1. Straight call.  PTRACE_CALL_FUNCTION(addr) just emulates CALL addr,
> shadow stack push and all.
>
> 2. Signal-style.  PTRACE_CALL_FUNCTION_SIGFRAME injects an actual signal
> frame just like a real signal is being delivered with the specified
> handler.  There could be a variant to opt-in to also using a specified
> altstack and altshadowstack.
>
> 2 would be more expensive but would avoid the need for much in the way
> of asm magic.  The injected code could be plain C (or Rust or Zig or
> whatever).
>
> All of this only really handles save, not restore.  I don't understand
> restore enough to fully understand the issue.

FWIW, CET enabled GDB can call a function in a CET enabled process.
Adding Felix who may know more about it.


-- 
H.J.

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