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Message-Id: <20220210224220.4076151-5-kaleshsingh@google.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 14:41:45 -0800
From: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: will@...nel.org, maz@...nel.org, qperret@...gle.com,
tabba@...gle.com, surenb@...gle.com, kernel-team@...roid.com,
Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@....com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@...een.com>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@....com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Andrew Scull <ascull@...gle.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] KVM: arm64: Allocate guard pages near hyp stacks
From: Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>
Allocate unbacked VA space underneath each stack page to ensure stack
overflows get trapped and don't corrupt memory silently.
The stack is aligned to twice its size (PAGE_SIZE), meaning that any
valid stack address has PAGE_SHIFT bit as 0. This allows us to easily
check for overflow in the exception entry without corrupting any GPRs.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>
[ Kalesh - Update commit text and comments,
refactor, add overflow handling ]
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S
index 3d613e721a75..78e4b612ac06 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/host.S
@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__host_hvc)
.macro invalid_host_el2_vect
.align 7
+
+ /* Test stack overflow without corrupting GPRs */
+ test_sp_overflow PAGE_SHIFT, .L__hyp_sp_overflow\@
+
/* If a guest is loaded, panic out of it. */
stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
get_loaded_vcpu x0, x1
@@ -165,6 +169,18 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__host_hvc)
* been partially clobbered by __host_enter.
*/
b hyp_panic
+
+.L__hyp_sp_overflow\@:
+ /*
+ * Reset SP to the top of the stack, to allow handling the hyp_panic.
+ * This corrupts the stack but is ok, since we won't be attempting
+ * any unwinding here.
+ */
+ ldr_this_cpu x0, kvm_init_params + NVHE_INIT_STACK_HYP_VA, x1
+ mov sp, x0
+
+ bl hyp_panic_bad_stack
+ ASM_BUG()
.endm
.macro invalid_host_el1_vect
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
index 99e178cf4249..114053dff228 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
@@ -105,7 +105,24 @@ static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size,
if (ret)
return ret;
- /* Map stack pages in the 'private' VA range */
+ /*
+ * Allocate 'private' VA range for stack guard pages.
+ *
+ * The 'private' VA range grows upward and stacks downwards, so
+ * allocate the guard page first. But make sure to align the
+ * stack itself with PAGE_SIZE * 2 granularity to ease overflow
+ * detection in the entry assembly code.
+ */
+ do {
+ start = (void *)hyp_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(start))
+ return PTR_ERR(start);
+ } while (IS_ALIGNED((u64) start, PAGE_SIZE * 2));
+
+ /*
+ * Map stack pages in the 'private' VA range above the allocated
+ * guard pages.
+ */
end = (void *)__hyp_pa(per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va);
start = end - PAGE_SIZE;
start = (void *)__pkvm_create_private_mapping((phys_addr_t)start,
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index 6410d21d8695..5a2e1ab79913 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -369,6 +369,11 @@ void __noreturn hyp_panic(void)
unreachable();
}
+void __noreturn hyp_panic_bad_stack(void)
+{
+ hyp_panic();
+}
+
asmlinkage void kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void)
{
return __kvm_unexpected_el2_exception();
--
2.35.1.265.g69c8d7142f-goog
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