| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXFCibuLxbv2VxVsS0mWJ=6Lv8Q8sNq2GfPQDJ9qi5XB8w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 11:47:29 +0100
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
To: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@...e.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
"joeyli.kernel@...il.com" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>,
"zohar@...ux.ibm.com" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"eric.snowberg@...cle.com" <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
"dhowells@...hat.com" <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"jlee@...e.com" <jlee@...e.com>,
"James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com"
<James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
"jarkko@...nel.org" <jarkko@...nel.org>,
"mic@...ikod.net" <mic@...ikod.net>,
"dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
Orlando Chamberlain <redecorating@...tonmail.com>,
Aun-Ali Zaidi <admin@...eit.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
for T2 Macs
On Thu, 10 Feb 2022 at 11:45, Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@...e.com> wrote:
>
> From: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@...e.com>
>
> On T2 Macs, the secure boot is handled by the T2 Chip. If enabled, only
> macOS and Windows are allowed to boot on these machines. Thus we need to
> disable secure boot for Linux. If we boot into Linux after disabling
> secure boot, if CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, EFI Runtime services
> fail to start, with the following logs in dmesg
>
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
> ? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
> ? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
> ? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
> kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
> __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
> bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
> do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
> exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
> asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
> (Removed some logs from here)
> ? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
> ? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
> ? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
> ? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
> ? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
> ? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
> ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
> ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
> ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> </TASK>
> ---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
> efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
> integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
> integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
> efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
> integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
> integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
> integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
> integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
> integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
>
> This patch prevents querying of these UEFI variables, since these Macs
> seem to use a non-standard EFI hardware
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@...e.com>
> ---
> v2 :- Reduce code size of the table.
NAK. As Matthew pointed out, other reads of the same variables may
still trigger the same issue.
> .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 8 ++++
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> index 2462bfa08..cd06bd607 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> @@ -30,3 +30,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
> efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
>
> #endif
> +
> +#ifndef UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT
> +#define UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT(vendor, product) \
> + .matches = { \
> + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, vendor), \
> + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, product), \
> + },
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> index 08b6d12f9..f246c8732 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/dmi.h>
> #include <linux/err.h>
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> @@ -12,6 +13,32 @@
> #include "../integrity.h"
> #include "keyring_handler.h"
>
> +/* Apple Macs with T2 Security chip don't support these UEFI variables.
> + * The T2 chip manages the Secure Boot and does not allow Linux to boot
> + * if it is turned on. If turned off, an attempt to get certificates
> + * causes a crash, so we simply return 0 for them in each function.
> + */
> +
> +static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = {
> +
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,2" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,3" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,4" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,2" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,3" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,4" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacMini8,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1" },
> + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2" },
> + { }
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
> * it does.
> @@ -21,12 +48,18 @@
> * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
> * this.
> */
> +
> static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
> {
> efi_status_t status;
> unsigned int db = 0;
> unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
> efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
> + const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
> +
> + dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
> + if (dmi_id)
> + return 0;
>
> status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
> return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
> @@ -41,6 +74,11 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
> unsigned long lsize = 4;
> unsigned long tmpdb[4];
> void *db;
> + const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
> +
> + dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
> + if (dmi_id)
> + return 0;
>
> *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
> if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> @@ -85,6 +123,11 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
> unsigned long moksize;
> efi_status_t status;
> int rc;
> + const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
> +
> + dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
> + if (dmi_id)
> + return 0;
>
> /* First try to load certs from the EFI MOKvar config table.
> * It's not an error if the MOKvar config table doesn't exist
> @@ -138,6 +181,11 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0;
> efi_status_t status;
> int rc = 0;
> + const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
> +
> + dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
> + if (dmi_id)
> + return 0;
>
> if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
> return false;
> --
> 2.25.1
>
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists