linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 07/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by

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Date:   Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:42:04 +0000
From:   Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>
To:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
        dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org,
        herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
        jarkko@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com
Cc:     eric.snowberg@...cle.com, keescook@...omium.org,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, weiyongjun1@...wei.com,
        nayna@...ux.ibm.com, ebiggers@...gle.com, ardb@...nel.org,
        nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@...hat.com, jason@...c4.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com, pjones@...hat.com,
        konrad.wilk@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE
 to restrict_link_by_ca

On Tuesday, 2021-11-23 at 23:41:14 -05, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to
> restrict_link_by_ca.  This will only allow CA keys into the machine
> keyring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>

Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>

> ---
> v1: Initial version
> v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok
>     keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled
> v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca
> v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set
> v5: Rename to machine keyring
> v6: split line over 80 char (suggested by Mimi)
> v8: Unmodified from v6
> ---
>  security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++--
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index 910fe29a5037..e7dfc55a7c55 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) &&
> +	    id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!restriction)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -	restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
> +	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
> +		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;
> +	else
> +		restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * No additional keys shall be allowed to load into the machine
> -- 
> 2.18.4