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Message-ID: <YgpjfncV+C9FEZDc@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 15:13:18 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
linux-m68k@...ts.linux-m68k.org,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v0] random: block in /dev/urandom
Hi Lennart,
On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 9:53 AM Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de> wrote:
> So, systemd uses (potentially half-initialized) /dev/urandom for
> seeding its hash tables. For that its kinda OK if the random values
> have low entropy initially, as we'll automatically reseed when too
> many hash collisions happen, and then use a newer (and thus hopefully
> better) seed, again acquired through /dev/urandom. i.e. if the seeds
> are initially not good enough to thwart hash collision attacks, once
> the hash table are actually attacked we'll replace the seeds with
> someting better. For that all we need is that the random pool
> eventually gets better, that's all.
>
> So for that usecase /dev/urandom behaving the way it so far does is
> kinda nice.
Oh that's an interesting point. But that sounds to me like the problem
with this patch is not that it makes /dev/urandom block (its primary
purpose) but that it also removes GRND_INSECURE (a distraction). So
perhaps an improved patch would be something like the below, which
changes /dev/urandom for new kernels but doesn't remove GRND_INSECURE.
Then your hash tables could continue to use GRND_INSECURE and all would
be well. (And for kernels without getrandom(), they'd just fall back to
/dev/urandom like normal which would have old semantics, so works.)
Jason
---------8<-----------------8<-------------------------------
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index cc296f0823bd..9f586025dbe6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static const struct memdev {
[5] = { "zero", 0666, &zero_fops, FMODE_NOWAIT },
[7] = { "full", 0666, &full_fops, 0 },
[8] = { "random", 0666, &random_fops, 0 },
- [9] = { "urandom", 0666, &urandom_fops, 0 },
+ [9] = { "urandom", 0666, &random_fops, 0 },
#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
[11] = { "kmsg", 0644, &kmsg_fops, 0 },
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index ce199af9bc56..ae4400c48b2f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -89,8 +89,6 @@ static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
/* Control how we warn userspace. */
static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
@@ -336,11 +334,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
unseeded_warning.missed);
unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
}
- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- urandom_warning.missed);
- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
- }
}
}
@@ -993,10 +986,8 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
}
- if (ratelimit_disable) {
- urandom_warning.interval = 0;
+ if (ratelimit_disable)
unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -1387,20 +1378,17 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
* getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
* be used in preference to anything else.
*
- * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
- * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
- * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
- * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
- *
- * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
- * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
- * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
+ * Reading from /dev/random and /dev/urandom both the same effect as
+ * calling getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however,
+ * they each had vastly different semantics and should therefore be
+ * avoided to prevent backwards compatibility issues.
*
* Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
* the input pool but does not credit it.
*
- * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
- * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
+ * Polling on /dev/random or /dev/urandom indicates when the RNG
+ * is initialized, on the read side, and when it wants new entropy,
+ * on the write side.
*
* Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
* adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
@@ -1485,21 +1473,6 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
return (ssize_t)count;
}
-static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
- loff_t *ppos)
-{
- static int maxwarn = 10;
-
- if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
- maxwarn--;
- if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
- pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
- current->comm, nbytes);
- }
-
- return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
-}
-
static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -1586,15 +1559,6 @@ const struct file_operations random_fops = {
.llseek = noop_llseek,
};
-const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
- .read = urandom_read,
- .write = random_write,
- .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
- .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
- .fasync = random_fasync,
- .llseek = noop_llseek,
-};
-
/********************************************************************
*
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