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Message-Id: <164486603894.3748820.17377347049312013591.b4-ty@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 11:14:03 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
On Mon, 31 Jan 2022 10:05:20 +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> The randomize_kstack_offset feature is unconditionally compiled in when
> the architecture supports it.
>
> To add constraints on compiler versions, we require a dedicated Kconfig
> variable. Therefore, introduce RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET.
>
> Furthermore, this option is now also configurable by EXPERT kernels:
> while the feature is supposed to have zero performance overhead when
> disabled, due to its use of static branches, there are few cases where
> giving a distribution the option to disable the feature entirely makes
> sense. For example, in very resource constrained environments, which
> would never enable the feature to begin with, in which case the
> additional kernel code size increase would be redundant.
>
> [...]
Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
[1/2] stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/8cb37a5974a4
[2/2] stack: Constrain and fix stack offset randomization with Clang builds
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/efa90c11f62e
--
Kees Cook
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