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Message-ID: <20220215115538.GJ21589@blackbody.suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 12:55:38 +0100
From: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>
To: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@....com.cn>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] set_user: Perform RLIMIT_NPROC capability check
against new user credentials
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 02:14:05AM +0100, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> wrote:
> However, I think you need to drop the negations of the return value from
> security_capable().
> security_capable() returns 0 or -EPERM, while capable() returns a
> bool, in kernel/capability.c: ns_capable_common():
Oops. Yeah, I only blindly applied replacement with a predicate for
(new) cred and overlooked this inverse semantics. Thanks for pointing
that out to me!
Nevertheless, this will likely be incorporated via Eric's series
anyway.
Michal
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