lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Mon, 21 Feb 2022 09:48:06 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 054/196] random: wake up /dev/random writers after zap

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>

[ Upstream commit 042e293e16e3aa9794ce60c29f5b7b0c8170f933 ]

When account() is called, and the amount of entropy dips below
random_write_wakeup_bits, we wake up the random writers, so that they
can write some more in. However, the RNDZAPENTCNT/RNDCLEARPOOL ioctl
sets the entropy count to zero -- a potential reduction just like
account() -- but does not unblock writers. This commit adds the missing
logic to that ioctl to unblock waiting writers.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index a27ae3999ff32..ebe86de9d0acc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1963,7 +1963,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		 */
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
-		input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
+		if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) && random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+		}
 		return 0;
 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-- 
2.34.1



Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ