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Message-ID: <04080c88-3e69-b4e6-0af2-0690accaa02f@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 09:45:12 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, kexec@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
luto@...capital.net, nivedita@...m.mit.edu,
kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux
kernel support
On 2/16/22 19:54, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to
> enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of
> focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing
> a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of
> Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing
> a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and
> cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming
> Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel
> follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution
> Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a
> boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has
> been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional
> component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the
> Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in
> development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage
> and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available.
What problem is this patch series solving? Is the same problem solved
in a different way in the kernel today? What is wrong with that
solution? What effects will end users see if they apply this series?
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