Message-ID: <20220224165625.2175020-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Date:   Thu, 24 Feb 2022 10:56:01 -0600
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>
CC:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        <brijesh.ksingh@...il.com>, <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        <marcorr@...gle.com>, <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 21/45] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit

Add the needed functionality to change pages state from shared
to private and vice-versa using the Page State Change VMGEXIT as
documented in the GHCB spec.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h |  22 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h        |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h   |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c             | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c     |  13 +++
 5 files changed, 209 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index f077a6c95e67..1aa72b5c2490 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -105,6 +105,28 @@ enum psc_op {
 
 #define GHCB_HV_FT_SNP			BIT_ULL(0)
 
+/* SNP Page State Change NAE event */
+#define VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY		253
+
+struct psc_hdr {
+	u16 cur_entry;
+	u16 end_entry;
+	u32 reserved;
+} __packed;
+
+struct psc_entry {
+	u64	cur_page	: 12,
+		gfn		: 40,
+		operation	: 4,
+		pagesize	: 1,
+		reserved	: 7;
+} __packed;
+
+struct snp_psc_desc {
+	struct psc_hdr hdr;
+	struct psc_entry entries[VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY];
+} __packed;
+
 #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ		0x100
 #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS	12
 #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK	0xf
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index f65d257e3d4a..feeb93e6ec97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					unsigned int npages);
 void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op);
+void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
+void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -142,6 +144,8 @@ early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned
 static inline void __init
 early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { }
 static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op) { }
+static inline void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { }
+static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index b0ad00f4c1e1..0dcdb6e0c913 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE		0x80000005
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE		0
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE		1
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC				0x80000010
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES			0x8000fffd
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT		0x8000ffff
 
@@ -219,6 +220,7 @@
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE,	"vmgexit_nmi_complete" }, \
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP,	"vmgexit_ap_hlt_loop" }, \
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE,	"vmgexit_ap_jump_table" }, \
+	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC,	"vmgexit_page_state_change" }, \
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES,	"vmgexit_hypervisor_feature" }, \
 	{ SVM_EXIT_ERR,         "invalid_guest_state" }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 1e8dc71e7ba6..4315be1602d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -655,6 +655,174 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op
 		WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
 }
 
+static int vmgexit_psc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
+{
+	int cur_entry, end_entry, ret = 0;
+	struct snp_psc_desc *data;
+	struct ghcb_state state;
+	struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+	/*
+	 * __sev_get_ghcb() needs to run with IRQs disabled because it is using
+	 * a per-CPU GHCB.
+	 */
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+	if (!ghcb) {
+		ret = 1;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the input desc into GHCB shared buffer */
+	data = (struct snp_psc_desc *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
+	memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, desc, min_t(int, GHCB_SHARED_BUF_SIZE, sizeof(*desc)));
+
+	/*
+	 * As per the GHCB specification, the hypervisor can resume the guest
+	 * before processing all the entries. Check whether all the entries
+	 * are processed. If not, then keep retrying. Note, the hypervisor
+	 * will update the data memory directly to indicate the status, so
+	 * reference the data->hdr everywhere.
+	 *
+	 * The strategy here is to wait for the hypervisor to change the page
+	 * state in the RMP table before guest accesses the memory pages. If the
+	 * page state change was not successful, then later memory access will
+	 * result in a crash.
+	 */
+	cur_entry = data->hdr.cur_entry;
+	end_entry = data->hdr.end_entry;
+
+	while (data->hdr.cur_entry <= data->hdr.end_entry) {
+		ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, (u64)__pa(data));
+
+		/* This will advance the shared buffer data points to. */
+		ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, true, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, 0, 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * Page State Change VMGEXIT can pass error code through
+		 * exit_info_2.
+		 */
+		if (WARN(ret || ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2,
+			 "SNP: PSC failed ret=%d exit_info_2=%llx\n",
+			 ret, ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2)) {
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Verify that reserved bit is not set */
+		if (WARN(data->hdr.reserved, "Reserved bit is set in the PSC header\n")) {
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Sanity check that entry processing is not going backwards.
+		 * This will happen only if hypervisor is tricking us.
+		 */
+		if (WARN(data->hdr.end_entry > end_entry || cur_entry > data->hdr.cur_entry,
+"SNP: PSC processing going backward, end_entry %d (got %d) cur_entry %d (got %d)\n",
+			 end_entry, data->hdr.end_entry, cur_entry, data->hdr.cur_entry)) {
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+out_unlock:
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __set_pages_state(struct snp_psc_desc *data, unsigned long vaddr,
+			      unsigned long vaddr_end, int op)
+{
+	struct psc_hdr *hdr;
+	struct psc_entry *e;
+	unsigned long pfn;
+	int i;
+
+	hdr = &data->hdr;
+	e = data->entries;
+
+	memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
+	i = 0;
+
+	while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
+		if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)vaddr))
+			pfn = vmalloc_to_pfn((void *)vaddr);
+		else
+			pfn = __pa(vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+		e->gfn = pfn;
+		e->operation = op;
+		hdr->end_entry = i;
+
+		/*
+		 * Current SNP implementation doesn't keep track of the RMP page
+		 * size so use 4K for simplicity.
+		 */
+		e->pagesize = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
+
+		vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
+		e++;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	if (vmgexit_psc(data))
+		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
+}
+
+static void set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
+	struct snp_psc_desc *desc;
+
+	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!desc)
+		panic("SNP: failed to allocate memory for PSC descriptor\n");
+
+	vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
+		/* Calculate the last vaddr that fits in one struct snp_psc_desc. */
+		next_vaddr = min_t(unsigned long, vaddr_end,
+				   (VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY * PAGE_SIZE) + vaddr);
+
+		__set_pages_state(desc, vaddr, next_vaddr, op);
+
+		vaddr = next_vaddr;
+	}
+
+	kfree(desc);
+}
+
+void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages)
+{
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+		return;
+
+	pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, false);
+
+	set_pages_state(vaddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
+}
+
+void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages)
+{
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+		return;
+
+	set_pages_state(vaddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+
+	pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, true);
+}
+
 int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
 {
 	u16 startup_cs, startup_ip;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 8539dd6f24ff..d3c88d9ef8d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -316,11 +316,24 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 
 static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
+	/*
+	 * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
+	 * to invalidate the memory before encryption attribute is cleared.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
+		snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
 }
 
 /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
 static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
+	/*
+	 * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
+	 * so that it is consistent with the page table updates.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && enc)
+		snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, npages);
+
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages, enc);
 
-- 
2.25.1

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