linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 3/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack

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Message-ID: <CA+EHjTy6DJt8Pcfj4JnVhSG0sQ7O09zvOaMP--aRuAsM=8zKUw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 24 Feb 2022 12:26:14 +0000
From:   Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>
To:     Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>
Cc:     will@...nel.org, maz@...nel.org, qperret@...gle.com,
        surenb@...gle.com, kernel-team@...roid.com,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@....com>,
        Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
        "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Andrew Walbran <qwandor@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Scull <ascull@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE
 hypervisor stack

Hi Kalesh,



On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 5:18 AM Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> Maps the stack pages in the flexible private VA range and allocates
> guard pages below the stack as unbacked VA space. The stack is aligned
> to twice its size to aid overflow detection (implemented in a subsequent
> patch in the series).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v3:
>   - Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark
>
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |  1 +
>  arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c             | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
> index d5b0386ef765..2e277f2ed671 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
> @@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ struct kvm_nvhe_init_params {
>         unsigned long tcr_el2;
>         unsigned long tpidr_el2;
>         unsigned long stack_hyp_va;
> +       unsigned long stack_pa;
>         phys_addr_t pgd_pa;
>         unsigned long hcr_el2;
>         unsigned long vttbr;
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> index ecc5958e27fe..7a23630c4a7f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> @@ -1541,7 +1541,6 @@ static void cpu_prepare_hyp_mode(int cpu)
>         tcr |= (idmap_t0sz & GENMASK(TCR_TxSZ_WIDTH - 1, 0)) << TCR_T0SZ_OFFSET;
>         params->tcr_el2 = tcr;
>
> -       params->stack_hyp_va = kern_hyp_va(per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu) + PAGE_SIZE);
>         params->pgd_pa = kvm_mmu_get_httbr();
>         if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
>                 params->hcr_el2 = HCR_HOST_NVHE_PROTECTED_FLAGS;
> @@ -1990,14 +1989,41 @@ static int init_hyp_mode(void)
>          * Map the Hyp stack pages
>          */
>         for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> +               struct kvm_nvhe_init_params *params = per_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(kvm_init_params, cpu);
>                 char *stack_page = (char *)per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu);
> -               err = create_hyp_mappings(stack_page, stack_page + PAGE_SIZE,
> -                                         PAGE_HYP);
> +               unsigned long stack_hyp_va, guard_hyp_va;
>
> +               /*
> +                * Private mappings are allocated downwards from io_map_base
> +                * so allocate the stack first then the guard page.
> +                *
> +                * The stack is aligned to twice its size to facilitate overflow
> +                * detection.
> +                */
> +               err = __create_hyp_private_mapping(__pa(stack_page), PAGE_SIZE,
> +                                               PAGE_SIZE * 2, &stack_hyp_va, PAGE_HYP);
>                 if (err) {
>                         kvm_err("Cannot map hyp stack\n");
>                         goto out_err;
>                 }
> +
> +               /* Allocate unbacked private VA range for stack guard page */
> +               guard_hyp_va = hyp_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
> +               if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL((void *)guard_hyp_va)) {
> +                       err = guard_hyp_va ? PTR_ERR((void *)guard_hyp_va) : -ENOMEM;

I am a bit confused by this check. hyp_alloc_private_va_range() always
returns ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) if there's an error. Mark's comment (if I
understood it correctly) was about how you were handling it *in*
hyp_alloc_private_va_range(), rather than calls *to*
hyp_alloc_private_va_range().

> +                       kvm_err("Cannot allocate hyp stack guard page\n");
> +                       goto out_err;
> +               }
> +
> +               /*
> +                * Save the stack PA in nvhe_init_params. This will be needed to recreate
> +                * the stack mapping in protected nVHE mode. __hyp_pa() won't do the right
> +                * thing there, since the stack has been mapped in the flexible private
> +                * VA space.
> +                */

Nit: These comments go over 80 columns, unlike other comments that
you've added in this file.

Thanks,
/fuad

> +               params->stack_pa = __pa(stack_page) + PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> +               params->stack_hyp_va = stack_hyp_va + PAGE_SIZE;
>         }
>
>         for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> --
> 2.35.1.473.g83b2b277ed-goog
>