[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9pTfwbs9xUJy_jrdPcrhSyVixSXBM==9EuB8v7ufWe9Pw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 16:15:28 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@...neltoast.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 4:11 PM Dominik Brodowski
<linux@...inikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>
> Am Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:49:12AM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> > On 2/24/22, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net> wrote:
> > > Am Wed, Feb 23, 2022 at 07:55:11PM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> > >> Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for PREEMPT_RT. That
> > >> is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still
> > >> trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the
> > >> analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things
> > >> here.
> > >>
> > >> But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the
> > >> crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash
> > >> function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when
> > >> considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
> > >> fast_mix() function.
> > >>
> > >> The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is
> > >> now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers
> > >> after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or
> > >> before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into
> > >> trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small,
> > >> especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
> > >>
> > >> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
> > >> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
> > >> Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@...neltoast.com>
> > >> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> > >> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
> > >> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
> > >> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> > >> ---
> > >> drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++-------------------------------
> > >> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> > >>
> > >> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> > >> index 536237a0f073..9fb06fc298d3 100644
> > >> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> > >> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> > >> @@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct
> > >> work_struct *work)
> > >> local_irq_enable();
> > >>
> > >> mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
> > >> - credit_entropy_bits(1);
> > >> +
> > >> + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0))
> > >> + crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true);
> > >> + else
> > >> + credit_entropy_bits(1);
> > >> +
> > >> memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
> > >> }
> > >
> > > Might it make sense to call crng_pre_init_inject() before mix_pool_bytes?
> >
> > What exactly is the difference you see mattering in the order? I keep
> > chasing my tail trying to think about it.
>
> We had that order beforehand -- and even if it probably doesn't matter, this
> means crng_pre_init_inject() gets called a tiny bit earlier. That means
> there's a chance to progres to crng_init=1 a tiny bit earlier as well.
Alright, I'll send a v2.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists