[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <YhhF0jEeytTO32yt@xz-m1.local>
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 10:58:26 +0800
From: Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...econstruct.com.au>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] userfaultfd, capability: introduce CAP_USERFAULTFD
On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 04:39:44PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> What I'd want to see is multiple users where the use of CAP_USERFAULTD
> is independent of the use of CAP_SYS_PTRACE. That is, the programs would
> never require CAP_SYS_PTRACE. There should be demonstrated real value.
> Not just that a compromised program with CAP_SYS_PTRACE can do bad things,
> but that the programs with CAP_USERFAULTDD are somehow susceptible to
> being exploited to doing those bad things. Hypothetical users are just
> that, and often don't materialize.
I kind of have the same question indeed..
The use case we're talking about is VM migration, and the in-question
subject is literally the migration process or thread. Isn't that a trusted
piece of software already?
Then the question is why the extra capability (in CAP_PTRACE but not in
CAP_UFFD) could bring much risk to the system. Axel, did I miss something
important?
Thanks,
--
Peter Xu
Powered by blists - more mailing lists