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Message-ID: <9d621439-108b-db42-d5ea-b390748d243b@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 08:33:20 -0600
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org
Cc: brijesh.singh@....com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
brijesh.ksingh@...il.com, tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
Hi Dov,
On 3/2/22 04:03, Dov Murik wrote:
> Hi Brijesh,
>
> On 24/02/2022 18:56, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
>> with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
>> read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
>> snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
>> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.
>>
>> The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
>> specified through the platform_data.
>>
>> Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
>> report.
>>
>> See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>> ---
>
> [...]
>
>> +
>> +static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen)
>> +{
>> + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
>> +
>> + crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>> + if (!crypto)
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> + crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
>> + if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm))
>> + goto e_free;
>
>
> When trying this series, the sevguest module didn't load (and printed no
> error message). After adding some debug messages, I found that the
> crypto_alloc_read() call returned an error. I found out that
> CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM was disabled in my config.
>
> Consider modifying sevguest/Kconfig to force it in:
>
>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
> index 2be45820e86c..74ca1fe09437 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
> @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
> config SEV_GUEST
> tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver"
> default m
> - depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT && CRYPTO_AEAD2
> + depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + select CRYPTO_AEAD2
> + select CRYPTO_GCM
> help
> SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with
> the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
>
>
>
> Another thing to consider is to add messages to the various error paths
> in snp_guest_probe(). Not sure what is the common practice in other modules.
>
I am not sure about sparkling the error message on the various paths,
but I agree with adding the 'select'.
If I happen to do v12, I will include it in my series; otherwise, the
maintainer can pull your above fixup on top of it.
thanks for looking into it.
~Brijesh
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