lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 08:33:20 -0600 From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org Cc: brijesh.singh@....com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>, brijesh.ksingh@...il.com, tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Hi Dov, On 3/2/22 04:03, Dov Murik wrote: > Hi Brijesh, > > On 24/02/2022 18:56, Brijesh Singh wrote: >> The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate >> with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to >> read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses >> snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or >> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP. >> >> The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key >> specified through the platform_data. >> >> Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation >> report. >> >> See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details. >> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> >> --- > > [...] > >> + >> +static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen) >> +{ >> + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto; >> + >> + crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); >> + if (!crypto) >> + return NULL; >> + >> + crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0); >> + if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm)) >> + goto e_free; > > > When trying this series, the sevguest module didn't load (and printed no > error message). After adding some debug messages, I found that the > crypto_alloc_read() call returned an error. I found out that > CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM was disabled in my config. > > Consider modifying sevguest/Kconfig to force it in: > > > > diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig > index 2be45820e86c..74ca1fe09437 100644 > --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig > @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ > config SEV_GUEST > tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver" > default m > - depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT && CRYPTO_AEAD2 > + depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT > + select CRYPTO_AEAD2 > + select CRYPTO_GCM > help > SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with > the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, > > > > Another thing to consider is to add messages to the various error paths > in snp_guest_probe(). Not sure what is the common practice in other modules. > I am not sure about sparkling the error message on the various paths, but I agree with adding the 'select'. If I happen to do v12, I will include it in my series; otherwise, the maintainer can pull your above fixup on top of it. thanks for looking into it. ~Brijesh
Powered by blists - more mailing lists