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Message-ID: <CAHmME9rf7hQP78kReP2diWNeX=obPem=f8R-dC7Wkpic2xmffg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 16:14:56 +0100 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@...hat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, QEMU Developers <qemu-devel@...gnu.org>, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>, "Michael Kelley (LINUX)" <mikelley@...rosoft.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, adrian@...ity.io, Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>, "Brown, Len" <len.brown@...el.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Linux PM <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>, Colm MacCarthaigh <colmmacc@...zon.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> Subject: Re: propagating vmgenid outward and upward Hi Michael, On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 3:46 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote: > I just don't see how "value changed while it was read" is so different > from "value changed one clock after it was read". Since we don't detect > the latter I don't see why we should worry about the former. The "barrier" is at the point where the plaintext has been chosen AND the nonce for a given keypair has been selected. So, if you have plaintext in a buffer, and a key in a buffer, and the nonce for that encryption in a buffer, and then after those are all selected, you check to see if the vmgenid has changed since the birth of that key, then you're all set. If it changes _after_ that point of check (your "one clock after"), it doesn't matter: you'll just be double-transmitting the same ciphertext, which is something that flaky wifi sometimes does _anyway_ (and attackers can do intentionally), so network protocols already are resilient to replay. This is the same case you asked about earlier, and then answered yourself, when you were wondering about reaching down into qdiscs. Jason
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