[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <e8452e86-4063-c85b-5e21-c7cd6ce51423@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 17:29:27 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
dave.hansen@...el.com, luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org
Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com, david@...hat.com,
hpa@...or.com, jgross@...e.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
joro@...tes.org, jpoimboe@...hat.com, knsathya@...nel.org,
pbonzini@...hat.com, sdeep@...are.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, vkuznets@...hat.com, wanpengli@...cent.com,
thomas.lendacky@....com, brijesh.singh@....com, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms
On 3/2/2022 10:27 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>
> There are a few MSRs and control register bits that the kernel
> normally needs to modify during boot. But, TDX disallows
> modification of these registers to help provide consistent security
> guarantees. Fortunately, TDX ensures that these are all in the correct
> state before the kernel loads, which means the kernel does not need to
> modify them.
>
> The conditions to avoid are:
>
> * Any writes to the EFER MSR
> * Clearing CR3.MCE
typo. CR4.MCE
BTW, I remember there was a patch to clear X86_FEATURE_MCE for TDX
guest. Why does that get dropped?
Even though CPUID reports MCE is supported, all the access to MCE
related MSRs causes #VE. If they are accessed via mce_rdmsrl(), the #VE
will be fixed up and goes to ex_handler_msr_mce(). Finally lead to panic().
Powered by blists - more mailing lists