linux-kernel - [PATCH] user_events: Add trace event call as root for low permission cases

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Message-Id: <20220308222807.2040-1-beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Date:   Tue,  8 Mar 2022 14:28:07 -0800
From:   Beau Belgrave <beaub@...ux.microsoft.com>
To:     rostedt@...dmis.org
Cc:     keescook@...omium.org, linux-trace-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        beaub@...ux.microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH] user_events: Add trace event call as root for low permission cases

Tracefs by default is locked down heavily. System operators can open up
some files, such as user_events to a broader set of users. These users
do not have access within tracefs beyond just the user_event files. Due
to this restriction the trace_add_event_call/remove calls will silently
fail since the caller does not have permissions to create directories.

To fix this trace_add_event_call/remove calls will be issued with
override creds of the global root UID. Creds are reverted immediately
afterward.

Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@...ux.microsoft.com>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
index 2b5e9fdb63a0..7dfa83ff2466 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
@@ -557,6 +557,41 @@ static struct trace_event_functions user_event_funcs = {
 	.trace = user_event_print_trace,
 };
 
+static int user_event_set_call_visible(struct user_event *user, bool visible)
+{
+	int ret;
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct cred *cred;
+
+	cred = prepare_creds();
+
+	if (!cred)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * While by default tracefs is locked down, systems can be configured
+	 * to allow user_event files to be less locked down. The extreme case
+	 * being "other" has read/write access to user_events_data/status.
+	 *
+	 * When not locked down, processes may not have have permissions to
+	 * add/remove calls themselves to tracefs. We need to temporarily
+	 * switch to root file permission to allow for this scenario.
+	 */
+	cred->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+
+	old_cred = override_creds(cred);
+
+	if (visible)
+		ret = trace_add_event_call(&user->call);
+	else
+		ret = trace_remove_event_call(&user->call);
+
+	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int destroy_user_event(struct user_event *user)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -564,7 +599,7 @@ static int destroy_user_event(struct user_event *user)
 	/* Must destroy fields before call removal */
 	user_event_destroy_fields(user);
 
-	ret = trace_remove_event_call(&user->call);
+	ret = user_event_set_call_visible(user, false);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -1037,7 +1072,7 @@ static int user_event_trace_register(struct user_event *user)
 	if (!ret)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	ret = trace_add_event_call(&user->call);
+	ret = user_event_set_call_visible(user, true);
 
 	if (ret)
 		unregister_trace_event(&user->call.event);

base-commit: 864ea0e10cc90416a01b46f0d47a6f26dc020820
-- 
2.17.1